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Executive Summary 
 
In 2013, following a grant agreement signed between UNISDR and the Indian Ocean Commission, a joint 
UNISDR/ISLANDS project was started entitled “Strengthening Capacities for Unified Climate Change Adaptation 
and Disaster Risk Reduction Through the Facilitation of Risk Transfer and Financing Mechanisms”. It was 
implemented within the “ISLANDS Programme for Financial Protection against Climatic and Natural Disasters”. It 
also forms a part of UNISDR’s global project for around 30 countries: “Building Capacities for Increased Public 
Investment in Integrated Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction: 2012-2015” financed by the 
European Union. 
Four island countries in the Indian Ocean as well as the Government of Zanzibar participated in the ISLDNDS 
programme composed of three components: the establishment of reliable disaster loss database (Component 1), 
risk evaluation and probabilistic risk assessment profiles (Component 2) and incorporation of risk management 
into public investment planning (Component 3). Economic analysis and policy reviews were developed as a 
package.  This report aims to summarize all activities implemented in the project with a focus on public 
investment planning (Component 3) while a technical report on Components 1 and 2 is also available1. 
As a first step (Component 1), a total of 105 data cards on disaster events and losses in the Union des Comores 
between 1980 and 2013 were registered in the national disaster loss databases. Economic loss totalled USD 9.8 
million (2012 constant price). When intensive and extensive losses are combined, cyclone causes 58% of total 
losses, followed by flood (35%) and storm (4%). In the following probabilistic risk analysis (Component 2), 
Average Annual Loss (AAL) for tropical cyclonic wind and earthquake was estimated at USD 0.16 million and 
USD 0.21 million respectively. Compared to the earthquake risk, tropical cyclonic winds represent a less 
important hazard since the associated losses for the same return periods are lower than those for earthquakes. 
This loss and risk information pointed to the need to reduce risk to natural hazards. However, in itself it did not 
suggest policy guidance. Grounded in the loss and risk analysis, a thorough policy review and economic analysis 
were implemented (Component 3).  
CATSIM analysis developed by IIASA identified that the fiscal resource gap year (i.e. the return period at which 
the government will face difficulty in raising sufficient funds for reconstruction) for tropical cyclone and earthquake 
hazards to be 56 to 77 years. This corresponds to the middle risk layer (i.e. between intensive and extensive 
risks) and means that Union des Comores must target risk reduction investment and development of risk 
financing mechanisms simultaneously. 
The subsequent probabilistic cost benefit analysis (CBA) presents how CBA can support concrete and specific 
decision-making. As an example, the CBA of house retrofitting to withstand flood and tropical cyclonic wind found 
that the retrofitting would be a cost-inefficient project. However, there are a number of factors regarding the data 
and assumptions that potentially limit the validity of the figures found in this project. For example, we have no 
concrete data on housing value, retrofitting costs and flood exposure.  
To explore the financial aspects of DRM policy, Union des Comores also estimated the current investment in 
disaster risk management by applying a DRM Marker method in an examination of national budgets, proposed 
for the OECD by the World Bank in partnership with UNISDR. The risk-sensitive budget review revealed that the 
Government of Union des Comores may be investing up to 7% of its annual budget on elements and efforts that 
contribute to DRM. However, as most of this appears to be invested in “principle” activities and as “response” it is 
a good time for the country to start exploring the value of investing in and in mainstreaming risk reduction.   
During several meetings with the Ministries of Finance in the IOC region, it was established that a scattered 
approach to DRM is inefficient and there is need for stronger collaboration between the DRM agency, Ministry of 
Finance and other key sectoral ministries. Continuous capacity building on risk terminology and concepts, loss 
and risk information management and economic analysis was recommended by Ministries of Finance in the 
region. 
                                                            
1 For component 1 and 2, please see UNISDR /IOC (2014). Component 1 and 2: Union des Comores, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Seychelles and Zanzíbar. Building capacities for increased public investment in integrated climate change adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction: 2012-2015. European Commission - Directorate General for Development and Cooperation. Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
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The loss and risk information should be examined from the perspective of both DRM policy maker and financial 
planners. Given the importance of public investment in DRR, continuous refinement of loss and risk information 
should be promoted through regular dialogue with data users. In the process of economic analysis, Ministries of 
Finance understood and appreciated the importance of loss and risk information. On some cases, they identified 
several mistakes and inconsistencies in the records in disaster loss databases and the data were corrected. 
Such exchanges of information will improve overall quality of knowledge management to support DRM decision 
making.  
Government needs to develop investment and financing strategies to address both extensive (small scale but 
high frequency) and intensive (low frequency but high impact). Climate change will increase risks in terms of 
frequency, geography and intensity. Understanding risk structures and the expected economic impact in the 
country is the critical first step to determine the optimum policy mix for each risk layer. In developing investment 
and financing strategies to address disaster risk, DRR investment and risk financing should not be considered 
separately. Depending on risk layers, the most appropriate policy mix changes and DRR investment and risk 
financing are not mutually exclusive. For example, DRR investment often decreases insurance premiums.   
This packaged approach with a focus on financial planners in government will be standardized and replicated in 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions in the coming years and the knowledge is planned to be archived 
and presented globally in a working paper series of UNISDR on “Public Investment and Financing Strategy for 
DRR”. The report summarizing activities in IOC region will thereby contribute to increasing the global knowledge 
base. 
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1. Introduction: Conceptual Framework 2 
In 2012, the UNISDR started a project called “Building capacities for increased public investment in integrated 
climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction: 2012-2015” under the financial sponsorship of EC- 
Development and Cooperation (EC-DEVCO). The initiative supports approximately 30 countries in Asia, Pacific, 
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean to systematically account for disaster loss and to develop probabilistic 
estimations of future risk. It provides a baseline for an economic approach toward better public investment 
planning. 
In the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) region, this initiative has been separately planned and implemented in 
2013-2015 in the cooperation with ISLANDS, in accordance with the project design developed by UNISDR and 
implemented through the “ISLANDS Financial Protection Programme against Climatic and Natural Disaster 
Risks”. 
The initiative has three components:  
• Component 1: disaster loss 
• Component 2: probabilistic disaster risk assessment 
• Component 3: public investment planning 
 
Component 3 of this initiative considers disaster risks in economic analysis to support and facilitate risk-proof 
public investment decision-making. It especially aims to contribute to the progress of HFA priority areas 
monitored through core indicator 4.6 “procedures are in place to assess the disaster risk impacts of major 
development projects, especially infrastructure” and 3.3 “Research methods and tools for multi-risk assessments 
and cost benefit analysis are developed and strengthened”.  
UNISDR has been in charge of designing methodologies for Component 3 and in the process, considered how 
natural science can be linked to social science to contribute to better decision making in public investment 
planning. In the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) region, this project has been planned and implemented from 
2013 to 2015 in cooperation with ISLANDS, in accordance with the project design developed by UNISDR.  
This report summarizes all activities implemented for Union des Comores3. Chapter 1 introduces basic country 
structure as background. Chapters 2 and 3 outline loss and risk as the starting point of analysis. Chapter 4 briefly 
explains the DRR policies of the country. Chapter 5 outlines the current state of risk-sensitive public investment 
planning and risk financing policy as well as brief summary of three types of economic analysis implemented in 
the country.  
In Component 3, we introduced tools a) to monitor DRM budgets to analyse the current state of public investment 
(called the “risk sensitive budget review”), b) to measure the impact of disasters on public finance and on the 
economy at the macro scale (CATSIM analysis), and c) to measure the impact of DRR investment on society 
(probabilistic cost-benefit analysis).  
In Chapter 6, recommendations for policy makers are presented drawing from the analyses implemented. 
Annexes A, B and C provide theoretical and technical background and detailed case studies on each tool. 
In this introductory chapter, the background, especially why we need risk-sensitive public investment, is 
explained. Then, the overall streamlined process from loss data analysis through probabilistic risk assessment 
into economic analysis is explained. Lastly basic concepts of economic loss are defined to provide a common 
understanding of key terminology.  
  
                                                            
2 This chapter was drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR) 
3 A series of workshop/meeting implemented in IOC region are listed in Annex D. 
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A. Background: what are challenges? 
Why do we need to promote risk-sensitive public investment?  First of all, economic loss due to disasters 
has been increasing in spite of substantial progress in DRR policies promoted by Hyogo Framework of Action 
(HFA) (Figure 1 and Figure 2).  HFA priorities have been progressing in all areas mainly due to the effort of DRM 
agencies. Especially during the past decade, capacity in monitoring and risk assessment has been developed in 
many countries. 
Figure 1: Economic loss due to natural disasters, 1980-2013 
 
Source: EM-DAT (http://www.emdat.be/database) 
Figure 2: HFA Progress 
Source: UNISDR 
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Disaster interrupts or slows down economic growth by damaging public and private infrastructures and negatively 
affecting people and economic activities. Figure 3 portrays the Pakistan GDP growth estimate calculated by 
JICA, clearly demonstrating that disasters will slow down economic growth and that DRR investment will mitigate 
the impact. 
Figure 3: Pakistan GDP estimate, 2005-2041 
 
Note: IDRR means DRR investment. 
Source: Author based on the figure provided by JICA 
 
Secondly, to reduce the impacts of disaster, governments need to invest in DRR. However, governments in most 
countries are suffering from tight budget constraints. Fiscal primary balance is expected to be negative in the 
coming years (Figure 4). The financial situations of low-income countries are especially tight. If we consider the 
debt and interest payment of many developing countries, the budgetary situation would be even tighter than the 
graph portrays. 
 
Figure 4: Primary balance (% of GDP), 2006-20174 
 
Source: Author based on IMF 
 
                                                            
4 The primary balance is the difference between a government's revenues and its non-interest expenditures; it is the most 
accurate reflection of government fiscal policy decisions. A country with a primary deficit, for example, spends more on roads, 
schools, defense, than it takes in from taxes and other revenues. Source: http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/histdb/. 
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Going deeper into the details of public finance, we can see the additional influence of budget constraints. Figure 
5 portrays how public investment has been under pressure due to constant or increasing financial need for 
government consumption. Public investment, especially in low and lower middle-income countries, is very 
volatile. On the other hand, in spite of these constraints, public investment is significant, recently representing 6 
to 10 % of GDP in developing countries. Governments must protect the hard-won fruits of these investments. 
Figure 5: Government consumption and investment (% of GDP), 1985-2011 
 
Source: Author based on the World Bank Development Indicators 
 
Why does disaster risk matter in public finance? Although “risk as opportunity” has become an attractive 
political motto, on the ground, disaster risk simply represents costs for financial planners (both public and private) 
and society. While we often focus on disaster loss and impacts, the overall cost of disaster risk is a summation of 
a) ex-ante DRR investment and risk financing mechanisms, b) post-event response, recovery and reconstruction 
cost and c) disaster loss and impacts. The cost of disaster risk management distracts financial resources from 
other priorities regardless of ex-ante or post event efforts. The impact of disaster risk on public finance should be 
considered based on the overview of these three categories of costs.  
Recently there is increasing attention on risk-sensitive private investment (GAR2013). However, disaster risk 
management mechanisms should be first considered as an issue of public finance because national 
governments assume primary responsibility to protect people and assets from disasters, and the risk preventive 
infrastructure represents public goods to remedy the problem due to market failure. 
In economics, public goods are characterized both as non-excludable and non-rivalrous in that individuals 
cannot be effectively excluded from use and use by one individual does not reduce availability to others. Classic 
examples of public goods include street lighting, police service, and fresh air and water. Paul A. Samuelson, in 
his seminal paper of 1954 entitled The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, defined a public good (what he called 
“collective consumption good") as follows: “[goods] which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's 
consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any other individual's consumption of that good.” 
Disaster risk reduction mechanisms are also public goods satisfying conditions of non-excludability and no-rivalry. 
Sea walls and early warning system protect many people and assets at once and do not exclude anyone. The 
problem of public goods is that no one wants to pay for the service and the goods are likely to be under-produced 
(i.e. free-rider problem5). 
                                                            
5 Typical examples of free rider problem include congestion in public roads and pollution of air and water. 
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The argument of public goods is closely related to market failure in economic theory. Market failure is a situation 
in which the allocation of goods and services by free market is not efficient. Market failures are scenarios in 
which the individual pursuit of pure self-interest leads to results that are not efficient – that can be improved upon 
from the societal point of view6. The typical causes that lead to market failures include lack of information, 
externalities, or public goods. 
When private sector does not properly assess the disaster risk, it tends to over-invest. While it is important for all 
members of society to properly recognize disaster risk, risk assessment is often costly and beyond the capacity 
of small and medium enterprises. 
Furthermore, the impact of disasters can be felt beyond private sector investment and spill over to society (e.g. 
damaged factory interrupts traffic and prevents response activity or interrupts production causing income 
decrease of the employee). In this case, portions of disaster costs are transferred to others in society. This 
phenomenon is called negative externality in economics. When externality exists, private sector does not have 
incentives to decrease investment in hazard prone areas even if they properly understand the risk. Government 
needs to commit to disaster risk management mechanisms precisely to provide sufficient risk information to 
society and thereby remedy the lack of information and externality problem.    
Assuring sufficient disaster risk management mechanisms reduces exposed and/or vulnerable areas and 
facilitates private investment in such areas. In this sense, disaster risk management mechanisms constitute 
important infrastructure supporting economic development of society. That is also a reason why government 
needs to commit to integrating disaster risk in public investment planning. 
In spite of decentralization trends, the role of national government does not diminish. Disaster risk management 
infrastructure, such as sea walls, are often very costly and beyond the financial ability of local governments. 
Given the positive externality of such infrastructure, national governments are justified to financially commit in the 
investment. Catastrophes such as Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 (just before HFA adoption) and Great East 
Japan Earthquake in 2011 (whose experience will influence post-2015 Framework for DRR informally called 
HFA-2) refocused the role of national government on their capability to prepare for and respond to intensive 
disaster risk. In the context of developing countries, accumulated impacts of low-to-mid scale disasters damage 
local level capacity and need support from national governments. 
In case of catastrophe, horizontal risk transfer mechanisms such as insurance may often not be sufficient. DRR 
investment is, unlike risk transfer mechanism, considered inter-generational risk sharing. Following the definition 
of sustainable development by the Bruntland Committee, only development that addresses the existing risks 
without compromising the ability of future generations to address them should be promoted.  
In summary, public investment in disaster risk management is theoretically justified and commitment of national 
level government is critical in spite of decentralization trends.  
What are the gaps to be filled? It is important to focus on the lack of linkages between natural science and 
social science, especially in economics. Risk information produced by natural science is not well connected to 
cost information examined by social science.  Even when risk information exists, if it is not linked to cost 
information, it is difficult to promote DRR Investment (Figure 6). For example, Solomon Islands states “If policies 
based on risk information would lead to increased project costs, budget constraints may limit utilization of the risk 
information. Promoting cost benefit analysis is necessary in order to counteract this “7.  
                                                            
6 A socially desirable state is called Paleto Optimum in economic terms. 
7 HFA Report of Solomon Islands, 2009-2011 Reporting Cycle 
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Figure 6: Required linkages between risk information and cost information 
 
Source: Author 
Related to the lack of cost information is an opportunity cost issue. Ministries of Finance are not concerned only 
about disaster risk. They need to respond to other competing country priorities. In many countries DRR is not a 
high priority and policymakers tend to allocate limited financial resources to other urgent needs such as poverty 
reduction, education and public health. It is also difficult to explain why there is a sense of urgency surrounding 
DRR, a challenge that often leads to problems securing financial resources. A classic dilemma for policy makers 
is whether they can justify giving up investment in growth and  in order to invest in DRR?  In other words, risk 
needs to be examined through a socio-economic lens in each country. 
In the DRM cycle, response, recovery and reconstruction also place pressure on the allocation of DRR budgets. 
Reconstruction and compensation for those affected is imminently needed in the majority of cases. In such 
situations, budget restructuring following a disaster often takes money away from DRR for use in reconstruction. 
To assure sufficient money for DRR investment, it is necessary to be able to justify the cost effectiveness of that 
DRR investment –as compared to expenditure in response and reconstruction. 
What exacerbates this difficult situation even more is that most countries do not have DRM labelling or dedicated 
budget lines for DRM in their public accounting system. So they don’t know how much they spend on DRR, 
response and reconstruction. Sectorial DRR is especially hard to label, as it is often embedded in larger projects. 
For example, earthquake proof school building is included under the larger category of school building so that the 
part of budget dedicated to strengthen the facility is not visible, making investment tracking almost impossible. 
Not having a DRM budget monitoring system results in the inefficient use of resources and an insufficiency of 
funds. Without knowing their current budget status, countries cannot properly evaluate the current level of DRM 
and estimate how much funding is required for further promoting DRM activities. Nepal claims “The budget 
allocated for disaster preparedness and mitigation is spread among different projects which render it ineffective. 
There is a need to develop and implement a financial tracking system to monitor all DRR related expenditures for 
mitigation, preparedness and emergency response”8.  
Considering all, the key questions that governments must tackle would be, "how much money should be 
allocated to DRM in total?” and “how to decide the most efficient and effective allocation of money between risk 
reduction and risk financing?” (Table 1).  Subsequently, more specific issues need to be examined: the design of 
risk sensitive investment mechanisms and risk financing mechanisms (i.e. appropriate combination of 
contingency funds, insurance and other tools). 
                                                            
8 HFA Report of Nepal, 20xx 
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Table 1: DRM structure 
Risk reduction Risk financing Disaster management 
Prevention  Mitigation Preparedness Transfer Proactive 
retention 
Response Reconstruction 
e.g. 
land use 
planning 
e.g. 
housing 
retrofitting 
e.g. 
contingency 
planning 
e.g. 
insurance 
e.g. 
contingency 
fund 
Emergency 
management 
Build back 
better 
 
B. Streamlined process for evidence based decision making 
Given challenges identified in Section B, how to combine risk and cost information?  The initiative introduced 
a five-step process (Figure 7). The first step was to identify loss trends and produce risk profile (mainly activity of 
Components 1 and 2). Subsequently, the current state of DRR policy, public investment policy and budget was 
examined to verify the gap between risk and DRR efforts. Expected impact on public finance was examined with 
more detail using the CATSIM model. Lastly, to examine the degree a DRR policy could mitigate the negative 
impact of a hazard, probabilistic cost benefit analysis was conducted. It is of note that there should be a cost 
benefit analysis for all kinds of DRR policies and this initiative presented a methodology using only one example. 
These analyses, combined, are expected to provide insights on and facilitate evidence-based decision making for 
risk-sensitive public investment planning. 
Figure 7: Overall design to support evidence based decision making 
Source: Author 
Understanding loss and risk in a country is the first step to evidence-based decision making. Loss and risk data 
present what has historically been lost and what is likely to be lost in future. Both loss and risk information 
contribute to produce hybrid curves portraying all possible combinations of probability of an event happening and 
the expected loss (Figure 8) in all risk layers including intensive (low frequency and high loss) and extensive 
(high frequency and small loss) (See Chapters 2 and 3). However, as outlined above, this information alone 
cannot determine how much should be invested in DRR.  
STEP 1: Identify loss trend and produce risk profile 
 (Loss analysis, risk assessment) 
STEP 2: Check the gap between the risk and current levels of DRR policy 
(Policy review, budget review) 
STEP 3: Measure the impact of disaster on economy and public finance 
(Macro-economic analysis) 
STEP 4: Measure the impact of investment on DRR 
 (Probabilistic Cost Benefit Analysis) 
STEP 5: Political discussion based on evidence 
(What to do with the gap between risk and current DRR?) 
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Figure 8: Hybrid loss exceedance curve 
  
Source: UNISDR 
Step 2 aims to determine the gap between risk and current levels of DRR policy. An examination of current DRR 
and investment policies and a comparison between risk levels and DRR investment will provide insights on how 
much investment in DRR is needed to fill the gap (Figure 9). (See Chapters 4, 5 and Annex A). 
Figure 9: Gap identification, drawn from budget and policy analysis 
 
Source: Author 
Step 3 measures the impact of disaster on economy and public finance, to further verify the expected impact of 
disasters on a country. The focus is not necessarily limited to direct loss and indirect loss, and macro-economic 
impacts are considered to a certain extent depending on the model. In the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) 
region, the CATSIM model developed by IIASA and taking indirect loss to a certain degree was used to measure 
the impact of disasters on public finance. (See Chapters 5 and Annex B) 
Step 4 aims to measure the impact of policy on DRR. Some policies are more cost efficient than others, meaning 
that such policies reduce risk more with less investment. Cost benefit analysis is implemented in this step. (See 
Chapter 5 and Annex C). DRR policy can shift the risk curve inward (i.e. lower frequency of event happening 
and/or decrease of expected loss) (Figure 10) 
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Figure 10: Shift of loss exceedance curve by DRR investment (blue) and new risk generation (red) 
Source: Author 
Climate change will also influence loss exceedance curve. However, investment in mitigation and adaptation can 
reduce the total cost. This is graphically expressed in Figure 11. Climate change will shift the curve upward while 
mitigation and CCA will work to shift the curve to original position. Climate change impact can be integrated into 
economic analysis of disaster risk applying the same methodological concept when disaster and climate change 
risk assessment are integrated. 
Figure 11: Climate change impact 
 
Source: Author 
These analyses, in combination, suggest that a risk-layered approach is crucial to manage disaster risk (Figure 
12). In the extensive risk layer (high probability and low expected loss), investment for risk reduction is basically 
the most cost-efficient. However, some measures for risk reduction (e.g. emergency drills as preparedness) can 
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be cost-efficient (and efforts should be devoted to) all risk layers. However, in the intensive layer (low probability 
and high expected loss), risk reduction is often an unaffordable and prohibitive option.  Regarding risk financing, 
contingency funds will be effective in middle risk layers. However, to prepare for intensive risk, risk transfer 
schemes, such as insurance, would be more cost-efficient. It is important to note that DRR efforts decrease the 
scope for risk financing mechanisms, bringing risk premiums down and making insurance more affordable.  DRR 
investment and risk financing mechanisms, therefore, should be considered in synergy to identify the optimum 
mix in public finance policy. 
Figure 12: Risk layered approach 
 
Source: Author 
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C. Basic concept of economic loss: direct loss, indirect loss and macro-
economic impact 
 
Disasters have diverse impacts on society; they are often categorized into economic, social and environmental 
impacts (Figure 13). Economic impacts include, for example, loss of assets and business interruptions. Social 
impacts include death, injury and changes to the functioning of communities, to name a few. Some impacts are 
both economic and social. For example, increased poverty and unemployment would be interpreted from both 
perspectives. Environmental impacts are for example, loss of habitats for animals and deforestation due to 
natural fire.  When these are all combined, disaster can have a macro-economic impact, for example, the 
reduction of GDP and trade balances. Economic analysis only focuses on the economic impacts of disaster. 
Figure 13: Impact of Disaster 
 
Source: Author 
 
It is important to clarify the difference between direct loss (physical loss centred), indirect loss and macro-
economic impact at the start of analysis (Figure 14, Table 2).  National disaster loss databases often focus only 
on direct loss.  Probabilistic risk assessment is also often limited to physical impacts of disasters. In these cases, 
economic analysis based on available loss and risk data will also be limited to direct loss only.  The initiative 
underway in this project is not an exception. Our focus in the cost benefit and CATSIM analyses is on direct 
physical loss and does not include indirect loss and macro-economic impact9. 
                                                            
9 CATSIM analysis includes indirect loss to certain extent because it considers “implicit liability” of government, which means 
compensation to the affected. For Madagascar, the impact of public finance on macro-economy was also estimated. 
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Figure 14: Direct loss, indirect loss and macro-economic impact 
 
Source: Author 
 
Table 2: Direct loss, indirect loss and macro-economic impact 
 Direct loss Indirect 
loss 
Macroeconomic 
impact 
Typical 
examples 
Loss of capital 
stock 
Loss of economic 
activities (e.g. Business 
interruption) after the 
event 
GDP 
Inflation 
trade balance 
Time frame Within the first 
few hours 
Up to multiple years Up to multiple years 
Concept stock flow flow 
Source: Author 
 
B.1. Direct loss 
Direct loss is nearly equivalent to physical damage. Examples include death and loss to physical assets such as 
damaged housings, factories and infrastructure.  Direct losses usually happen within the first few hours after the 
event and are often assessed immediately after the event to estimate recovery cost and claim insurance 
payment. These are tangible and can be relatively easily measured. However, there are still technical challenges, 
for example, how to assign monetary value to such damage. Or, should direct losses should be estimated as 
purchased value, book value10 or replacement cost1112?  
There is another important issue in measuring direct loss; “How to evaluate human loss?”  There are some 
methodologies, for example, that evaluate human loss as lost income. However, this remains an on-going debate 
among economists because assigning monetary value to human life is an ethical issue, considered morally 
                                                            
10 Book value means the current value of the asset on accounting book taking depreciation into consideration. 
11 Replacement cost can be cheaper than the price at which the asset was purchased. For example IT machines usually have 
become much cheaper during this decade.  In this case, loss reported using purchased price means overestimation of the loss. 
12 Due to lack of data availability and urgent need to identify the recovery costs, replacement costs are often used in the world 
as a practical solution. 
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wrong. If we use the lost income approach, the life of a rich person is more valuable than a poor person. But 
sometimes, monetary value is assigned to human loss. For example, after 911, NY City estimated the monetary 
value of human loss in the World Trade Center, Many were high income, young to middle-aged people who pay 
high taxes and consume and invest heavily in the NY economy. The economic planner of city government 
practically would have needed the economic and financial impact of loss of such people, but this is a very rare 
case. It is not common to monetize human loss13.  
In the case of earthquake impacts on building assets, if data on probabilistic distribution of earthquake hazards, 
building by structure and age, and the past disaster record are availabe, we can estimate the value of expected 
building damage.  If we multiply the number of houses destroyed by average cost of construction, then we can 
estimate monetary value of such building loss (Figure 1514). 
Figure 15: Impact of earthquake on building 
 
Source: Author 
 
Regarding human loss due to earthquakes, if similar data such as probability, building structure and age, and 
past disaster records are available, then we can also estimate mortality (Figure 16). 
                                                            
13 This does not necessarily mean policy makers should not evaluate human loss at all. Most economists simply claim that 
human loss should not be evaluated at monetary value.  Human loss should be counted as number of person killed, injured etc.  
Cost-effectiveness approach is developed for economic evaluation to determine options, for example, to reduce mortality. In a 
similar way to cost-benefit analysis explained in Annex C, this approach compares several options and evaluates cost-
efficiency given certain objective such as x % reduction of mortality. 
14 The formula in the figure is often called “vulnerability function” in probabilistic risk assessment. 
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Figure 16: Mortality estimate process 
 
Source: Author 
 
It is clear from the examples that we need to have risk profiles, past loss data and baseline data, for example 
number of buildings by structure and age to estimate the loss.  
B.2. Indirect loss and macro-economic impact 
Indirect loss is more complicated. For example, a reduction in labour force and physical capital will cause 
business interruption and therefore a decrease in production. The reduction of production might be instantly 
recovered but most often it lasts several years. Damage to economic activity, therefore, should be monitored 
over a longer period.  Indirect losses are conventionally estimated within maximum of five years; it is reported 
that most loss occurs in the first two years after the disaster. Measurable impacts are often loss to production and 
income due to destruction of physical assets15. Though these indirect losses might be seemingly measurable, it is 
difficult to isolate the impact of disaster from others, for example, global financial crisis16.  Technically speaking, 
to estimate indirect loss, it is necessary to have a “production function” linking labour and capital with production.   
There are immeasurable indirect losses, which can be positive or negative, for example, human suffering 
(negative) or increased sense of mutual help (positive). Though they are not easily measurable, it is important to 
recognize such issues.  
Macro-economic impact is much more complicated, because economic activity is interlinked. For example, 
production decreases are likely to push prices upward, if demand level remains stable. The rise of price level will 
increase interest rates17. High interest rates will bring private investment demand down. Reconstruction activity 
through public spending might produce effective demand for depressed economy but might crowd out private 
investment in growing economy. To estimate macro-economic impact, it is important to model the causal 
relationship of all these factors. Macro-economic impacts such as GDP, inflation and trade balances will often 
                                                            
15 Decrease of production will impact the wage level and dividend level. 
16 Another difficult issue would be for example, that lost product has two prices, which are producer price and consumer price. 
When measuring production sector’s loss, then producer price would be more appropriate. On the other hand, if it is desirable 
to measure the loss from the interrupted service, consumer price would be better. 
17 The reason for this increase is because people want to withdraw money from the bank, and banks need to set high interest 
rates, as incentives to maintain deposit levels. 
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persist for several years and should also be monitored over time. They are conventionally estimated within 
maximum of five years after disaster events.  
Indirect loss and macro-economic impacts are highly analytical and the results change depending on many 
factors. First, the result depends on geographic scale, for example, municipality, region, or nation. For example, 
the impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake on the national economy is estimated to be negative (i.e. a loss in 
production). But if we look at the regional scale, while Miyagi prefecture including Sendai City-- severely affected 
by the tsunami-- had a negative impact, Tokyo had a positive impact --an increase in production to cover the loss 
in Miyagi prefecture.  
Second, the result depends on the time an impact is estimated. As time passes, more information is gathered but 
some information will also be lost. For example, the estimate of one month after the event usually cannot 
integrate the impact of reconstruction activity on macro economy. In the case of intensive disasters, even after 
one year, the impact of reconstruction activity cannot be fully evaluated. 
Third, the result also depends on the availability of baseline economic scenarios. The impact of a disaster on the 
macro economy should exclude other factors. For example, if the economy has been declining for the past 
decade and is likely to decline in coming five years, even if the GDP decreases after the disaster, that might be 
reflecting the general economic trend more than the event itself. 
Forth, the results depend on the definition of impact, which is likely to be politically influenced by main concern 
for society and its policy makers. In case of 911, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) estimates 
included the increase of security costs. After Niigata earthquake of Japan --which also caused nuclear power 
plant problems, though much smaller scale than Fukushima, Niigata prefecture included an estimate of the 
impact of “reputation loss” due to the nuclear problem. 
B.3. Macro-economic impact 
In analysing macro-economic impact, it is very important to analyse the impact from supply and demand sides 
and short and long-term perspective (Table 3). From supply side, decrease of production due to capital loss can 
be observed as a negative impact in the short term. However, in the long term, replaced new and more 
productive factories can improve efficiency and produce positive impact. From the demand side, decline of 
income, asset value, and population can be all observed as negative impacts in the short term. However, 
reconstruction demand can have a positive impact, especially for depressed economies that lack effective 
demand. The total impacts can be evaluated as the balance of supply and demand side impacts. A macro-
economic model is constructed based on many assumptions reflecting causal relationships that impact both the 
demand and supply sides (Figure 17 and Figure 18). 
Table 3: Macro-economic impact 
  Short Term 
Impact 
Long Term 
Impact 
Supply Decline of production 
capacity due to capital 
loss 
Negative  
Technological progress 
(e.g. replacement of 
factory) 
 Positive 
Demand Decline of income Negative  
Decline of asset value Negative  
Population decrease Negative Negative 
Reconstruction demand Positive Positive 
Source: Author 
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Figure 17: Example of economic modelling 
 
Source: Author 
 
When macro-economic modelling is not available or a more micro-level approach is more practical, a sectoral-
based approach might be preferable. The essence of estimating economic impact is in how disasters impact 
labour and capital --the two most important factors for economic growth (Figure 18). If capital and/or labour 
decrease, production will decrease based on the production function. Each sector, or even each company, has a 
different production function. Those results will constitute GDP estimates (Figure 19). Sectors often assessed are 
infrastructure, schools, hospitals, energy etc. However, when summarizing them, we need to be careful about 
double-counting and the inter-relationship between sectors. When each sector is not well coordinated, double-
counting often occurs.  Inter-relationships between sectors also should be checked using an input-output table, if 
possible. 
Figure 18: Production function 
 
  Source: Author 
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Figure 19: Production function by sector 
 
  Source: Author 
 
B.4. Impact on public finance 
When considering the impact of disasters on public finance, similarly we need to explore the demand and supply 
sides of public finance. On the demand side, increased need for expenditure in response, recovery and 
reconstruction are always observed. On the supply side, decrease of financial resources by reduced tax and fees 
can be also noted. Therefore, fiscal balances almost always worsen (Figure 20). 
Figure 20: Fiscal impact of disasters 
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Source: Author 
 
A worsened fiscal balance often has a negative impact on the macro economy. Figure 21 below presents three 
cases of a negative chain of fiscal impact: debt increase, expansion of monetary supply, tax increase. Whichever 
option a government takes, it will have a negative impact on macro-economy. IIASA’s CATSIM model estimates 
the impact of public finance on macro-economy. 
Figure 21: Relationship between fiscal impact and economic impact 
Source: Author 
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2. Disaster Loss18 
A. Overview 
Component 1 of this initiative was to build a disaster loss database that registers not only large-scale but also 
small-to-medium scale disasters. The small-to-medium scale disasters are rarely registered in the international 
disaster databases, because their effects are considered to be less relevant from a macroeconomic perspective. 
However, such disasters usually impact the livelihoods of poor people, perpetuating their level of poverty and 
human insecurity, and eroding government budgets. They exacerbate local level sustainability and pose serious 
problems for the development of a country as a whole. The analysis of disasters at all scales allows the 
identification of aggregated effects over time, regional areas and hazards targeted as high priority, and impacts 
on housing and livelihoods of local communities.  
Loss information contributes to comprehensive risk assessment by providing an estimate of the risk of high 
frequency but small-scale risk. It also gives information on non-modelled hazards. Furthermore, it can be utilized 
as an input to economic analysis, for example cost benefit and economic impact analysis. The key concepts 
introduced in the loss data analysis are: 
Intensive disasters: high-severity, mid to low frequency disasters, mainly but not exclusively associated with 
high profile fast-onset hazards. UNISDR classifies disasters as intensive when at least 30 people are killed, 
and/or a minimum of 600 houses are destroyed. 
Extensive disasters: low severity, high frequency disasters, mainly but not exclusively associated with highly 
localized and often slower-onset hazards. All disasters with less than 30 people killed, and/or less than 600 
houses destroyed, are classified as “extensive”. There is no minimum number of deaths or damaged houses to 
be considered extensive19. 
During the project, data on extensive and intensive disasters that occurred from 1980 to 2014 were collected. 
The data were registered by district, which allows more detailed examination of loss distribution in the country. 
The current loss database basically registers direct physical loss data only. Indirect and socio-economic loss data 
are not registered in principle. Even if registered, it needs to be analysed with caution due to ambiguity of 
definitions. The disaster data not directly associated with natural hazards (e.g. traffic accident, marine accident, 
epidemic, shark attack) were registered in the database but excluded for analysis in this report20. 
The disaster loss database takes into account the different disaster types and registers a series of indicators to 
classify impact such as:  
- Damaged houses 
- Destroyed houses 
- Basic human loss (mortality, injured, affected).  
The loss data were assigned monetary value by applying the methodology developed by UNISDR, which allows 
comparison across countries21. 
Civil Protection authority in Union des Comores hosted Component 1 with cooperation from the Ministry of 
Environment. 
The data is open to public in the following 
site:http://www.desinventar.net/DesInventar/profiletab.jsp?countrycode=com 
                                                            
18 This chapter was drafted by Sylvain Ponsere (UNISDR)  
19 The most well-known international disaster loss database called EM-DAT registers disasters for a minimum of 10 deaths (see 
http://www.emdat.be/criteria-and-definition). 
20 Fire is included in the analysis, though. 
21 For methodology of assigning monetary value to loss, see http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2013/en/gar-
pdf/Annex_2.pdf 
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B. Disaster loss in Union des Comores22 
Union des Comores is generally prone to a wide range of natural hazards including Volcanic eruptions, cyclones, 
flash floods, torrential rains, landslides, drought, pest, epidemics, tsunamis and tidal waves. Coastal erosion 
arising from climate change can also be added to this list. 
A total of 105 data cards were registered for natural hazards: 104 cards were categorized as extensive disasters 
while only one card was categorized as an intensive disaster. Intensive loss was due to Tropical Storm Doloresse 
in 1996, which resulted in 67 deaths. 
Out of 105 extensive disasters, flood is the most frequent/prevalent (72%), followed by, fire (11%), volcanic 
eruption (5%) and cyclone (4%) (Figure 22). 
Figure 22: Extensive event by hazard 
 
Source: Author based on Union des Comores National Loss Database  
Total mortality to the 105 disaster events is 34, mainly due to flood and cyclone. 
Economic loss (physical and agriculture) is estimated at USD 9.8 million at 2012 prices. When intensive and 
extensive losses combined, cyclone caused 58% of total losses, followed by flood (35%) and storm (4%) (Figure 
23).  
 
                                                            
22 For detailed methodology, see UNISDR/IOC (2014) and http://www.desinventar.net/methodology.html 
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Figure 23: Total economic loss (physical and agriculture) 
 
Source: Author based on Union des Comores National Loss Database  
The island of Ngazidja is impacted more than other islands in term of mortality and economic losses.  
Though not having registered much economic losses and mortality, the eruption of Mount Karthala in 2005 
affected 2,000 people. The Karthala volcano is very active, having erupted more than 20 times since the 19th 
century. 
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3% 
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(physical and agriculture) 
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3. Disaster Risk23 
A. Overview 
Component 2 of this initiative aimed to build a database for probabilistic risk assessment. UNISDR facilitated the 
identification and consolidation of a national focal point for disaster risk information and enhanced the 
understanding of risk concepts and risk assessing methodologies through capacity building workshops 
Probabilistic risk assessment differs from a “deterministic” risk assessment in that it attributes a probability to 
hazardous events. Probability indicates the likelihood of the event to occur during a given year; it is estimated 
using frequency and is expressed in terms of “return period” or “loss exceedance rate”. Risk is expressed as a 
combination of the probability of the event occurring and the expected loss when such an event occurs. 
In probabilistic risk assessment, risk is composed of three factors: hazard, exposure and vulnerability (Figure 24).  
Hazard data are basically calculated from a set of stochastic scenarios and in this initiative the data were 
extracted from global datasets24. Exposure data measures the degree at which people and assets will be at risk 
when a hazard hits, and often consists of inventories of buildings, population and infrastructure. In this initiative, 
we used a combination of global exposure databases and data compiled by national experts (processed to 
construct a proxy). Vulnerability indicates the susceptibility of exposed population or assets to suffer damages 
and loss. This is important because hazard affects exposed element in different ways. For example, a certain 
wind speed affects a wooden house more heavily than a concrete building. In other words, vulnerability data 
show the relationship between hazard intensity and the expected values of damage. In this initiative, vulnerability 
data were also taken from global data sets. 
Figure 24: Key concepts of probabilistic risk assessment 
 
Source: Author 
                                                            
23 This chapter was drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR). 
24 Hazard, exposure and vulnerability data used for the risk assessment in Union des Comores is outlined in INGENIAR (2014) 
and UNISDR/IOC (2014). 
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Based on probabilistic risk assessment, a loss exceedance curve for each hazard is produced (Figure 25). The 
curve shows the relationship between each value of the losses and the likelihood (probability) of having such loss 
during one year. 
Figure 25: Loss exceedance curve 
 
Source: Author 
This curve enables the calculation of important national risk metrics called Annual Average Loss (AAL) and 
Probable Maximum Loss (PML).  The AAL is basically the combination of all the potential losses that can occur 
every year due to a particular hazard, weighted according to their likelihood of occurrence. Simply said, the AAL 
is the loss that can be expected every year, regardless of whether it actually occurs or not. It gives insights into 
investment planning because the value shows how much risk should be reduced or transferred annually to 
prepare for all layers of risk. The PML is the loss associated to a specific, usually long return period. PML is a 
loss that is not frequent, therefore usually high, but still plausible. PML is a useful reference value to draft a worst-
case scenario and prepare for intensive events.  
Probabilistic risk assessment can be utilized for diverse policy areas, from emergency management planning to 
land use planning and financial and investment planning. However, caution should be given to the limitation 
caused by scarce data that feed into probabilistic risk assessment, and simplified modelling of complex 
phenomena. 
In the IOC region, UNISDR supported probabilistic risk assessment for tropical cyclone (wind) and earthquake 
hazards. Tropical cyclone was selected because it was clear from the disaster loss data outlined in Chapter 2, 
that the region (especially Madagascar and Mauritius) has been hit by cyclone very often causing much loss. 
Earthquake was selected due to data availability given the short time frame of the initiative, even though it is not 
a major hazard for the region. 
UNISDR and the national team collaborated to produce hybrid loss exceedance curves that combine probabilistic 
risk curves based on data collected in Component 2 with empirical risk curves based on historic loss data 
registered in Component 1 (see Chapter 2). Probabilistic risk assessment tends to underestimate the extensive 
risk and historic loss data is used to remedy this problem. 
The challenge is that the current historic loss databases have time series that are too short to produce high 
quality risk assessments. Achieving more detailed risk assessments requires continuity on capacity building 
processes, improvement of data/information and commitment of institutions, technical personnel and decision 
makers. 
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As described above, the probabilistic risk assessment implemented in this initiative is very often based on global 
data and does not have high resolution. Therefore it cannot be utilized for detailed cost benefit analysis, local 
planning and insurance premium calculation. The result is currently also limited to the assessment of physical 
assets due to data availability. However, the result can be very useful to raise awareness of disaster risk and 
initiate dialogues on incorporating DRM into the country’s public investment planning. 
In Union des Comores, Director General of Meteorology in Ministry of Interior, ANACEM in Ministry of Finance 
and Budget, Union of Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Union des Comores (UCCIA), and 
Consular of Legal Affairs participated in the disaster risk assessment activities for Component 2. 
B. Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Union des Comores25 
In Union des Comores, UNISDR and the national team conducted probabilistic risk assessments for tropical 
cyclonic wind and earthquake risk; both are described below. 
 
B.1. Cyclone wind risk assessment 
 
Table 4 presents the AAL and PML in absolute and relative values to exposed assets, gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) and GDP.  AAL is USD 0.16 million and constitutes 1.9‰ of GFCF. PML is USD 2.61 million 
for a 50-year return period and it increases with longer return periods. Compared to the earthquake risk, tropical 
cyclonic winds represent a less important hazard, since the associated losses for the same return periods are 
much lower than those for earthquakes. 
Table 4: AAL and PML for tropical cyclonic wind in Union des Comores 
  
 
 
USD million 
 
Exposed 
Assets 
(2014) 
 
 
 
GFCF 
(2013)  
 
GDP 
(2013) 
808.1 85.99 450.11 
Absolute Relative 
Annual Average Loss (AAL) 0.16 0.20‰26 1.9‰ 0.4‰ 
Probable Maximum Loss (PML)   
Return Period (years) 50 2.61 0.3% 3.0% 0.6% 
100 3.13 0.4% 3.6% 0.7% 
250 3.87 0.5% 4.5% 0.9% 
500 4.52 0.6% 5.3% 1.0% 
1000 5.05 0.6% 5.9% 1.1% 
Sources: Exposed Assets AAL, PML: UNISDR/IOC (2014), GFCF and GDP: World Bank development indicator 
 
Figure 26 shows the loss exceedance curve while Figure 27 shows the PML curve. In addition, the loss 
exceedance curves for given different periods, specifically 50, 100 and 200 years, are presented in Figure 28. 
These plots show the probability of exceeding a certain value of loss in a given time frame; for example, the 
probability of exceeding loss of USD 2.61 million (PML for a 50-year return period) in the next 50 years is 
approximately 63 %.  
                                                            
25 For detailed data source and methodology, see UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
26 Mille is a mathematical term that means per thousand, as its name in French suggests. It is represented by the symbol ‰. 
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Figure 26: Loss exceedance curve for tropical cyclonic wind 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
 
Figure 27: PML curve for tropical cyclonic wind 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Figure 28: Exceedance probability curves given different times 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
The analysis of risk concentration is first carried out for the different islands, and then for the different sectors (for 
both the public and private sectors, and for the main components of infrastructure at national level).  
Figure 29 and Figure 30 show the AAL (absolute and relative to the exposed value) by islands. The risk in 
absolute and relative terms is concentrated in Anjouan while in relative terms the risk is also concentrated in 
Moheli. The geographical location of both islands makes them more susceptible to tropical cyclones. The higher 
absolute AAL of Anjouan compared to Moheli is due to the higher exposed value. In spite of lower exposed value 
in Moheli, the assets in Moheli are more vulnerable to strong winds than the ones in Anjouan, which explains high 
relative risk in the Island. 
Figure 29: AAL (absolute and relative) by island for tropical cyclonic winds 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Figure 30: AAL (absolute and relative) by island for tropical cyclonic winds 
 
 
Figure 31 summarizes the AAL (absolute and relative to the exposed assets) for for each sector. In absolute 
terms, the Residential Low-Income and Middle-Income constructions among the built environment assets 
database have the highest risk level to tropical cyclonic wind in Union des Comores. In relative terms, both, the 
Residential Low-Income and the High-Income constructions are the assets that have the highest relative risk 
level to tropical cyclonic wind.  The residential sector (high, middle and low income) are the constructions with the 
highest relative AAL. Public and private education present also a high relative AAL due to tropical cyclonic wind 
but a very low absolute AAL if compared to the residential sector.  
 
 
 
Absolute AAL Relative AAL 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Figure 31: AAL by sectors for tropical cyclonic winds  
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
 
B.2. Earthquake risk assessment 
 
Table 5 presents the AAL and PML in absolute and relative values to exposed assets, GFCF and GDP. AAL is 
USD 0.21 million and constitutes 2.44‰ of GFCF. PML is USD 0.49 million for 50 years of return period and it 
increases when return periods get longer. Given the proximity of the islands to the continental Africa, strong 
earthquakes are more likely to occur in Union des Comores compared to other countries. However, the seismic 
risk in Union des Comores can be considered low; even though a loss of USD 42 million may seem high, it only 
occurs, on average, every 1,000 years. Despite the fact that the risk is low, they should not be considered 
negligible because an extreme event can generate high disruptions, damages and causalities. 
Table 5: AAL and PML for earthquakes 
  
 
 
USD million 
 
Value of 
Exposed 
Assets 
(2014) 
 
 
GFCF 
(2013) 
 
GDP 
(2013) 
808.1 85.99 450.11 
Absolute Relative 
Annual Average Loss (AAL) 0.21 0.03‰ 2.44‰ 0.47‰ 
Probable Maximum Loss (PML)  % 
Return Period (years) 50 0.49 0.06% 0.57% 0.11% 
100  1.25  0.15% 1.45% 0.28% 
250  5.70  0.71% 6.63% 1.27% 
500  17.09  2.12% 19.87% 3.80% 
1000  42.07  5.21% 48.92% 9.35% 
Sources: Exposed Assets, AAL, PML: UNISDR/IOC (2014), GFCF and GDP: World Bank Development Indicators  
 
Figure 32 presents the loss exceedance curve and Figure 33 presents the PML curve. In addition, the loss 
exceedance curves given different exposure periods, specifically 50, 100 and 200 years, are presented in Figure 
34; these plots show the probability of exceeding a certain value of loss in a given exposure time frame; for 
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example, the probability of exceeding a USD 17 Million of loss value (PML for 500 years return period) in the next 
50 years is approximately 10%. 
Figure 32: Loss exceedance curve for earthquakes 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
 
 
Figure 33: PML curve for earthquakes 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Figure 34: Exceedance curves given different periods 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
 
The analysis of risk concentration is first carried out for the different islands, and then for the different sectors (for 
both the public and private sectors, and for the main components of infrastructure at national level).  
Figure 35 and Figure 36 show the AAL (absolute and relative to the exposed value) by island. The regional 
distribution of risk is totally different from the one for tropical cyclonic wind risk. The risk in absolute and relative 
terms is concentrated in Grande Comore while in relative terms the risk is also concentrated in Anjouan Island. 
Risk concentration in Grande Comore is related to the fact that the total exposed value is concentrated the most. 
A relative AAL of 0.28 ‰ means in general terms that the total value of Grade Comores can be lost every 3,500 
years. Although it may seem a very long period of time, it is important to recognize that it corresponds to a mean 
estimate and a worse scenario can happen. Therefore it should not be neglected. Anjouan Island has around half 
the exposed value of Grande Comore, however, relative AAL is very similar to the one in Grande Comore. This 
situation should be assessed with more detail. 
Figure 35: AAL (absolute and relative) by island for earthquakes 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Figure 36: AAL (absolute and relative) by island for earthquakes 
 
 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
 
Figure 37 summarizes the AAL (absolute and relative to the exposed assets) for each sector. In the case of 
earthquakes, the residential sector (low income and middle income constructions) are the assets that present the 
highest values while regarding the AAL in relative terms the sectors of education, both, public and private, and 
health public and private present the highest values even their absolute value is very low. 
 
Figure 37: AAL by sector for earthquakes 
Source: UNISDR/IOC (2014) 
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Due to the limited data in disaster loss database outlined in Chapter 2, we could not produce hybrid curves. 
Reference 
 
UNISDR /IOC (2014). Component 1 and 2: Union des Comores, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and 
Zanzíbar. Building capacities for increased public investment in integrated climate change adaptation and 
disaster risk reduction: 2012-2015. European Commission - Directorate General for Development and 
Cooperation. Geneva, Switzerland.  
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4. National DRM/DRR/CCA Framework27 
 
A. Institutional Structures 
To date in Union des Comores DRM efforts consist of rebuilding after extreme events rather than trying to reduce 
risks or build resistant structures. Union des Comores is just starting to establish institutional entities explicitly 
mandated to manage risk. Among the prominent stations in government, a National Platform for DRR (PNRRC in 
French) was created in 2010. A ministerial committee and executive body, the Directorate General of Civil 
Defense (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Civile or DGSC in French), coordinates this platform. 
The DGSC, also in its capacity as the focal point of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), is the leading 
national partner of the project "Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction into policies to reduce the poverty of 
Union des Comores” supported by UNDP-Comoros. This project focuses on the establishment of structures and 
foundations, agents and guidelines for risk reduction. It is in this context that the country is trying to articulate 
appropriate measures to reduce disaster risk and to develop the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(SNRRC in French). 
The state entities and organizations primarily involved in disaster risk management to date are detailed below. 
Activities such as prevention, preparedness and reconstruction are not addressed systematically. Overall the 
entities include: 
 
• Ministry of the Interior (MoI) 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)  
• Directorate General of Civil Protection (DGSC) 
• Technical Directorate of Meteorology (DTM and ANACM) 
• Volcanological Observatory of Karthala (OVK) 
• Regional Directorates of Civil Defense (Grand Comore - Anjouan and Moheli) 
• National Directorate of Health (DNS) 
• Directorate for Land and Infrastructure 
• Directorate General of Environment and Forest (DGEF) 
• Directorate General of Budget (DBN) 
• General Planning Commission (CGP) 
• Production Station - Anjouan 
• Production Station – Moheli 
• Union of Chambres of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (UCCIA) 
• Comoros Red Crescent (CRCo) 
• University of Union des Comores 
 
A few details are provided below for the main institutions. 
 
The Directorate General of Civil Protection (DGSC): Governmental structure created in 2012 by Decree No. 
12-054 / PR, is mandated to protect population, property and the environment, and to coordinate the 
development of a national DRM strategy and ensure its implementation. Theoretically it also has a role in risk 
reduction.  The DGSC ensures the Permanent Secretariat of the National Platform for DRR (PNRRC). In spite of 
its mandate, it is in an embryonic stage. Prior to its creation, it was serving since 2007 as COSEP (Centre des 
opérations de secours et de la protection civile). 
 
From the perspective of human resources and professional skills, DGSC does not have qualified staff in the field. 
A strengthening of expertise, human capacity and technical skills is necessary for proper prevention and 
preparedness for different hazards. The DGSC has a Center for Information Processing Analysis (CATI) 
responsible for collecting, analyzing and processing geo-referenced data. However, the center lacks qualified 
technical and human resources to carry out the tasks entrusted to them. 
 
The Technical Directorate of Meteorology (DTM and ANACM):  Given the lack of financial resources and the 
necessary equipment, ANACM lacks expertise and professional skills in all services. Despite involvement in DRM 
from the institutional point of view, it keeps few data cards for hydro-meteorological hazards. Its surveillance 
system is primarily based on information generated outside the country. Thus, in practice, the management does 
not play its role in the prevention or monitoring extreme weather events responsible for major disasters and risks. 
 
Volcano Observatory of Khartala (OVK): Opened in 1986, the OVK has a dual mission; the first is to ensure 
continuous monitoring of the activity of the Karthala volcano and the second is to conduct scientific research to 
                                                            
27 This chapter was drafted by Lezlie Moriniere with inputs from the National ISLANDS team in Union des Comores. 
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better understand the internal structure of the volcano, geology and especially understand the mechanisms of its 
activity. Despite long experience and networking with DGSC and the University, the OVK continues to suffer from 
inadequate supervision; with a very small staff (two technicians), this does not allow it to conduct strong research, 
including the history of eruptions.  
 
The future institutional framework is being redesigned under the imminent National Strategy for the Reduction of 
Risk and Disasters (SNRRC). 
 
B. Legal Structures 
At present, the Union des Comores has developed eight national-level plans that are related to DRM. They 
include:  
• National Plan for Preparedness and Response in Emergency 
• Plan for Organizing Relief (ORSEC) 
• Response Plan for Karthala volcano eruptions 
• National Contingency Plan 
• Specialized Cyclone Relief Plan 
• Contingency Plan Cyclones / Flood in the health sector 
• Specialized Tsunami emergency plan  
• Plan for Marine Pollution (MARPOL) 
 
Other legislative and regulatory texts have been developed to strengthen the legal framework for managing 
disaster risks. They include: 
- Environmental Law Decree No. 94-100 / PR on Article 70 that there is a commitment to the contingency 
plans (response in crisis situations); 
- Decree of Health Law No. 95-013 / PR in Chapter VI on the fight against disasters, stipulated in Articles 
179, 180 and 181. 
 
Yet other decrees such as laws on the code of urbanism and habitat, forestry law etc. do not yet take into 
account major risks.  
The recent mainstreaming DRR into the National Sustainable Development Strategy 2015-19 (known by the 
name of Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable, or SCA2D), demonstrates a serious 
political and strategic commitment by the Government of Comores. The SCA2D has established the following 
DRM related specific objectives: 
• To strengthen the scientific knowledge and information systems to predict disasters 
• To strengthen institutional preparedness and capacity of the population to disasters and their 
consequences 
• To strengthen the response capacity of the population and organized government upon the occurrence 
of disasters 
• To improve reconstruction capacity and resilience of communities after disasters. 
 
This document constitutes the national framework for monitoring and implementation of policies, strategies and 
Comorian sustainability programs as well as programmes by its development partners. 
The National Strategy for the Reduction of Risk and Disasters (SNRRC) is still in draft form at the time of this 
project. The SNRRC action plan will be aligned with that of the SCA2D and its measures are organized according 
to the different phases of DRR. They were identified during a consultation workshop using a participatory 
approach. There are six strategic objectives defined, and 27 program components proposed therein to 
substantially reduce disaster risks. Each component includes a series of activities to reduce disaster risks, 
planned for five years following the implementation of the priority action plan.  The SNDRR aims to align to the 
following strategies: 
- The Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005 - 2015 
- The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) 
- The Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
-  African Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
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5. DRR/DRM/CCA in Public Investment Planning28 
This chapter provides an overview of the current status of public investment planning related to disaster risk 
reduction/management and climate change adaptation in Mauritius. It moreover contains a summary of the 
findings of the three types of analyses conducted under the initiative; namely the Risk Sensitive Budget Review 
(RSBR), CATSIM analysis and the Cost Benefit Analysis. 
A. Current Status of DRR/DRM/CCA Public Investment Planning 
No special measure for public investment has been set up to address DRR/CCA in Union des Comores. Laws 
and guidelines do not exist yet to deal with these issues. A disaster risk assessment has not been required for 
public investment projects because there are not yet guidelines to support such efforts. Disaster risk is also not 
yet integrated into environment impact assessment for public investment because of lack of guidelines.  
Some government entities and Ministries have implicitly achieved DRR investment (National Assembly, 
President’s Office, Ministries of Health, Production and Education, etc.) but those initiatives are not coordinated 
and harmonized. Each agency plans their DRR/DRM activities independently. Moreover, Union des Comores 
does not have a critical infrastructure protection plan.  
Ministry of Finance leads the budgetary planning processes of each Ministry but does not require, to date, cost 
benefit analysis in the budget request process. 
B. Contingency Finance Mechanisms 
Government will take not only the legal and explicit liability but also the implicit liability where government is 
expected to intervene promptly to provide relief and recovery to the affected (damaged and destroyed housing, 
loss of property). There are a few finance mechanisms to manage disasters, summarized in Table 6. These 
mechanisms mainly address recovery and reconstruction costs.  
Table 6: Finance mechanisms for disaster management 
EX-ANTE MECANISMS  
Contingency budget 
line 
There wasn’t a specific budget line before the Finance Law of 2015. It 
represents 5% of the 2015 National Budget.  
Contingency funds 
An emergency fund was created after the 2012 floods and was approved by 
the Ministries Council and managed by a special commission created and 
managed by the Prsidents Office and followed by the Ministry of Finance. 
Contributions by the State and the Private Sector, the sum is not totally 
utilized. It is in a special account in case of emergency, but hasn’t been 
updated.   
Insurance 
The private sector and public infrastructure are not covered by insurance. 
Some enterprises are covered by insurance, but the Government has not a 
strategy for encouraging insurance subscriptions.  
Others No 
EX-POST MECANISMS  
Diverting funds from  
other budget items 
Fonts are not diverted from other budgetary linesOn peut pas affirmer des 
détournements des postes budgétaires especially since there was no specific 
budget lines before the 2015 Finance Act. 
 
Imposing or raising 
taxes  
Never used Union des Comores; it is unlikely to come true in light of financial 
position of Comoros. 
Taking a credit from 
the Central Bank 
(either prints money or 
depletes foreign 
currency reserves)  
It is quite possible, and the practice is used frequently in the past. In case of 
natural disasters including all possible to print money or deplete but in the 
context of the implementation of the overall budget. 
Borrowing by issuing 
domestic bonds 
Never used Union des Comores 
Accessing international 
assistance 
The government generally expected international and national support when 
catastrophic events occur. It must be said that the major natural disasters 
                                                            
28 This chapter was drafted by Lezlie Moriniere, based on inputs supplied by Union of Comores ISLAND project team. 
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appear as new phenomena in the Comoros. This explains why public financial 
strategies did not exist to deal with DRR / DRM (or were not actually 
implemented) 
Borrowing from 
multilateral institutions 
Never used Union des Comores 
Issuing bonds on the 
international market 
Not used until now.  
Source: Union des Comores, Ministry of Finance 
C. Economic analysis to support risk sensitive pubic investment planning 
Based on the philosophy explained in the introduction chapter, three types of economic analysis were conducted. 
A summary of analysis follows for the Risk-Sensitive Budget Review, the Macro/CATSIM assessment and the 
Micro/Cost Benefit Analysis. Each of the theoretical and technical elements is also described in greater detail in 
corresponding Annexes A, B and C. 
C.1. Summary of the Risk-Sensitive Budget Review  
(See also Annex A for theoretical and technical background) 
Overview: The Risk-Sensitive Budget Review (RSBR) aims to apply the DRM Marker method to identify the 
degree to which government has budgeted or/and invested in DRR/DRM/CCA. To that effect, the budgets of key 
Ministries and Departments have been analysed to mark those projects whose “significant” (but not main) 
objective is DRR and those projects specifically addressing DRR, which would not have been undertaken without 
the “principal” DRM objective.  
In addition to categorizing the budget/expenditure for different projects, functions and administration activities as 
Significant or Principal, they were classified into four distinct categories of disaster risk management, namely, 
Risk Prevention/mitigation, Preparedness, Response/Relief and Reconstruction. 
The resources of the Comorian State allow it mainly to cover its operating expenses, including paying pensions, 
salaries and wages of personnel, insuring the external debt service and paying contributions to international 
organizations. Once these expenses are incurred, the balance is normally distributed among four units: the Union 
itself, and the autonomous islands. To this end, the Union of the Comores has only four budgets and one finance 
law. Due to limited internal resources, public investment needs are generally covered by economic and financial 
partners, mainly represented by multilateral aid (EU, UNDP, WB) and bilateral (China, France, Japan, etc.), but 
also by the support of the emirates of the Persian Golf (Qatar, Kuwait, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Oman, etc.   
In this risk-sensitive budget review, we examined data of the central government (but not the island budgets) 
from 2011 to 2014, we have broken down into three sections (operating, investment and debt), distributed in ten 
ministries, a presidency, a national assembly, two houses (Supreme and Constitutional) and the common 
expenses managed by the Ministry of Finance. 
Scope: Table 7 below summarizes the scope of the budget review. 
Table 7: Scope of the risk sensitive budget review 
Year 2011 to 2014 (4 years) 
Coverage 
National Assembly, Office of the President, Ministry of Health, Solidarity, Social 
Cohesion and Gender; Ministry of Production, Environment, Energy and Industry; 
Ministry of National Education, Research, Culture, and the Arts; Authority for Youth 
and Sports; Finances and budget – Communal Spending 
Budget or expenditure Budget 
Current or Capital Current and Capital 
Targeted hazards Uncertain 
 
Results: The overall estimated investment in DRM identified in this review is on average 1.4 billion (USD 3.7 
million), which is approximately 7% of the total budget of 21 billion (USD 52 million) during the period 2011-2014 
(see Table 8) and has been regularly increasing since 2011.  
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Table 8: DRR/CCA Investment" 
 
These sums, recalculated as USD, are featured in Table 9. Most of the budget is identified as “Principle”. This 
may indicate that there is little mainstreaming across ministries and efforts to date. The only “significant” 
investment was marked in prevention/mitigation (under the Ministries of Production, and Education). 
The Budget Review also classified the marked investment according to the DRM process. By far the most 
important category that was tagged is for Response, demonstrating the need to consider DRR more explicitly.  
The second greatest investment is in prevention/mitigation, and it is uncertain to what extent the budget (Table 9) 
currently includes the Volcano Observatory.  
 
Table 9: DRM/CCA investments across 4 components for the 4-year Average (2011-2014) 
Investment per Risk Management 
phase/category 
Significant 
(USD million) 
Principal 
(USD 
million) 
Total 
(USD million) 
Percentage  
of Total 
Marked 
Prevention/mitigation (1) 0.39 1.35 1.74 37% 
Preparedness  (2)   0.07 0.07 2% 
Response (3)  2.39 2.39 65% 
Reconstruction (4) 0 0 0 0% 
Average annual budget allocations 
(2011-14)  
0.39 3.81 4.2  
Share of total budget (USD 52.12 million) 7% 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Budget / calculated by author 
Component 2 of the project determined an average annual loss of USD 0.37 million to tropical cyclonic wind and 
earthquakes combined.  A simple comparison of estimated AAL to the most current annual investment in DRR 
indicates a positive balance: greater investment (USD 4.2 million) than expected loss in the present year. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that AAL is only estimated for tropical cyclonic wind and earthquake risk’ 
it is critical to go back to the actual marked activities in the budget to determine their link to cyclonic wind or 
earthquake risk. If this investment could be reasonably linked to cyclone or earthquake risk reduction, it would 
seem to offset the AAL by many years (Table 10). 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 AVERAGE+MARKED
MARKED MARKED MARKED MARKED AVERAGE
Assemblée(National(de(l'Union Aides(et(Secours(médicaux 20,000,000 20,000,000 20,000,000 20,000,000 20,000,000
Aides(et(Secours(médicaux 10,939,912 12,033,903 12,033,903 11,721,022 11,682,185
Evacuation(sanitaire 69,399,120 75,339,032 75,339,032 73,380,217 73,364,350
Projet(SIDA 20,000,000 18,800,000 20,116,000 20,000,000 19,729,000
Programme(Elargie(de(Vaccination 20,000,000 18,800,000 20,116,000 20,000,000 19,729,000
Lutte(Contre(les(Epidémies 5,800,000 5,452,000 5,833,640 5,833,640 5,729,820
Lutte(Contre(le(Paludisme 20,000,000 18,800,000 20,116,000 20,000,000 19,729,000
Evacuation(sanitaire 20,000,000 18,000,000 18,000,000 18,000,000 18,500,000
Total+Ministère 186,139,032 187,224,935 191,554,575 188,934,879 188,463,355
Bureau(Géologique (P((((( ((((((((((((P((((( 90,000,000 80,660,000 85,330,000
Parc(Marine(de(Mohéli (P((((( (((((((((((((((P((((( 5,000,000 4,905,000 4,952,500
Direction(Nationale(des(ressources(Halieutiques (P((((( 58,525,376 58,525,376 57,003,716 58,018,156
Total+Ministère +@+++++ 58,525,376 153,525,376 142,568,716 148,300,656
Centre(Nationale(d’Horticole 5,400,000 4,050,000 4,050,000 4,050,000 4,387,500
Centre(National(de(Recherche(Scientifique 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
Ecole(Nationale(des(Travaux(Publics 50,175,000 50,175,000 80,175,000 80,175,000 65,175,000
Ecole(Nationale(de(la(Pêche 39,549,700 39,549,700 37,549,786 37,549,786 38,549,743
Total+Ministère 100,124,700 98,774,700 126,774,786 126,774,786 113,112,243
Imprévues 597,680,750 631,429,833 930,653,466 839,066,527 749,707,644
Aides(et(Secours(médicaux 93,437,993 91,505,713 91,505,713 91,505,713 91,988,783
Projet(habitat 122,000,000 127,072,000 190,274,840 540,274,840 244,905,420
Total+Ministère 813,118,743 850,007,546 1,212,434,019 1,470,847,080 1,086,601,847
TOTAL 1,099,382,475 1,194,532,557 1,684,288,756 1,929,125,461 1,476,832,312
TOTAL(STUDIED(BUDGETS 20,021,374,249 21,012,270,829 21,012,270,829 22,193,798,350 21,059,928,564
SHARE(OF(TOTAL(BUDGET 5% 6% 8% 9% 7%
Finances(et(budget(P(dépenses(
communes
Présidence(de(l'union
Ministère(de(la(santé,(de(la(
solidarité,(de(la(cohésion(
sociale,(et(de(la(promotion(du(
genre
Ministère(de(la(production,(de(
l’environnement,(de(l’énergie,(
de(l’industrie(et(de(l’artisanat
Ministère(de(l’éducation(
nationale,(de(la(recherche,(de(
la(culture,((des(arts,(chargés(de(
la(jeunesse(et(des(sports
Ministères Désignation
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Table 10: Checking the Gap: DRR Investment, loss and risk 
 DRM Investment  
(budget),  
3-year average of         
2011-2014 
AAL 
(tropical cyclonic wind 
and earthquake only) 
Loss, 1980-2014 
(105 data cards) 
Value 
 USD 4.2 million USD 0.37 million 
USD 9.8 million 
(Annual average: 
USD 0.29 million) 
Status  NO GAP NO GAP 
 
As reference, loss data were also compared to the budget. Again, this comparison also shows a positive balance, 
as even the average registered loss over past 34 years (USD 0.29 million) is lower than the annual investment in 
DRR.  
Although this is only a very simple and straightforward example that cannot be extrapolated to other hazards or 
years, it serves to underscore the utility of the AAL, Loss analysis and the budget review as a combined tool to 
move Union des Comores towards risk-sensitive public investment in light of their most important natural 
hazards.  
C.2. Summary of Macro-Analysis / CATSIM  
(See also Annex B for theoretical and technical backgrounds and a detailed case study) 
 
Overview: CATSIM analysis evaluates the ability of governments to manage potential fiscal and economic risk 
arising from tropical cyclone winds and earthquakes. The Government is generally not responsible to provide all 
reconstruction needs because private households and businesses will assume responsibility of their own 
reconstruction needs. Therefore, we assume that the government will take the following responsibility in case of a 
disaster: 
• The Union des Comores government will be responsible to finance reconstruction of public assets, 
including roads, bridges, schools and hospitals, etc. (Explicit liability) 
• The Union des Comores government will extend partial support for private relief and recovery including 
provision of support to the poor (Implicit liability) 
 
AAL was estimated to be USD 1.07 million. Total liabilities of Union des Comores Government were estimated as 
USD 1.6 billion based on capital stock data. Then, the options to finance reconstruction and recovery were 
examined and same assumptions across IOC countries are applied. In a conservative case, USD 10.6 million 
were estimated to be assured through diversion from budget, domestic bonds and credit and international market 
borrowing.  
Combining direct risk and fiscal resource availability information compiled, we then estimated the governments’ 
potential fiscal resources gap year—the return period at which the government will face difficulty in raising 
sufficient funds for reconstruction.  
Combining direct risk and fiscal resource availability information obtained, it is estimated what would be the 
governments’ potential fiscal resources gap year—the return period at which the government will face difficulty in 
raising sufficient funds for reconstruction.  
Results: Union des Comores was found to face a fiscal resources gap at year 77 (CAPRA estimate) (Figure 38). 
Based on the loss distribution available from Hochrainer-Stigler (2014), a fiscal resource gap year was estimated 
at 56 years (Figure 45). Based on the CAPRA estimate, the reconstruction and recovery capital needs are 
estimated at: USD 1.85 million (20 year event), USD 6.90 million (50 year event) and USD 14.0 million (100 year 
event) and USD 34 million (500 year event) respectively. MFI and international borrowing constitute a larger 
portion of reconstruction and recovery costs as return period increases where above 70 % of the costs will be 
financed through these means for the 50 year and 100 year events. The financing gaps are expected to increase 
to USD 1.96 million in the 100-year event and USD 20 million in the 500-year event (Figure 46). 
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Figure 38: Resources gap year analysis for Union des Comores 
 
Source: IIASA 
The government is encouraged to take a ‘layered risk management’ approach where resources are allocated 
based on the varying levels of risk facing the country, with a priority given to reducing existing risk and preventing 
the creation of new risks in the extensive risk layer (Figure 39).  The CATSIM analysis conducted from Steps 1 to 
3 has illustrated the need for improved management of disaster risk in Union des Comores.  
For Union des Comores, the combination of risk reduction and risk financing will be most effective to manage 
fiscal risk from cyclone wind and earthquake risks in the country. Given that Union des Comores does have 
specific budget lines allocated for disaster risk reduction nor contingency budget that can be carried-over across 
fiscal years, that the establishment of a reserve fund where a certain percentage of unspent money can be used 
for DRR investment activities may provide good risk management strategies that can cover the mid-layer of risk.  
Figure 39: Risk Layering Approach 
  
Source: IIASA 
Union des Comores 56-77 years 
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The present study identified data gaps and sources of uncertainty regarding fiscal risk assessment. The present 
studies did not fully account for indirect effects of disaster damage, and further studies are needed to quantify 
and evaluate the indirect risks caused by disaster damage. 
Risk assessments of additional hazards including cyclone (rain/storm surge), floods, volcanic eruption etc. are 
certainty needed to conclude on a more comprehensive assessment of fiscal risks that Mauritius faces. 
Given the relatively short period of data availability, high uncertainty can be expected of catastrophic risks with 
return periods of above 500. It is advisable, therefore, further data collection, validation and analysis performed in 
an iterative fashion to reduce the range of uncertainty.   
A technical and institutional support package is necessary to establish iterative risk management system in Union 
des Comores and other IOC countries (Table 11). In terms of technical needs, knowledge regarding probabilistic 
risk assessment and economic assessment tools (CATSIM) would be needed along with general awareness of 
risk related concepts and statistics. Given the limited availability of risk experts in IOC countries, a regional 
approach to training and capacity building (e.g. regional workshop for training of trainers/ regional sharing of risk 
knowledge experts, etc.) may be an effective way to leverage local capacity and resources. Institutional support 
for iterative management should be embedded in the existing DRR/CCA policy framework of Union des 
Comores.  
It is important to discuss and update fiscal resilience parameter and value at critical time, for example, when 
administration changes or after disaster. Financing mechanism for disaster management (see Table 6 in Chapter 
5) should be checked regularly. Defining government liability more concretely is also recommended. 
Some of the important policy questions to ask in Union des Comores would be: 
-­‐ What is the desirable level of fiscal preparedness in the country? What would be the policy goal in mid 
to long-term (maintain or reduce fiscal gap etc)? 
-­‐ How can you balance the need for risk reduction and risk-transfer? 
-­‐ What are the priority areas of action regarding DRR in your country? 
-­‐ What are tangible milestones and goals in the DRR priority areas in your country?    
-­‐ What further risk assessment is needed to achieve the goals of DRR priority areas in your country? 
 
Table 11: Identified data gaps, technical and institutional capacity needs 
Data needs: 
-Risk information regarding additional hazards such as flood, cyclone (rain & storm surge), 
drought will improve the scope of analysis 
-Uncertainty regarding larger return period events is high given the relatively short period of 
data availability (In Component 1, loss data was collected since 1980). Further data collection 
will improve accuracy especially for higher return period events 
Technical capacity needs: 
-Technical training on risk assessment and economic modeling including CAPRA and 
CATSIM training.  
-Further sensitization of risk-based thinking. General familiarity of risk based terms such as 
the annual average loss, the probable maximum loss, exceedance probability must be 
explained to decision-makers.  
Institutional capacity 
needs: 
-Coordination, where both risk and socio-economic data are jointly collected and managed by 
relevant agencies (DRM agency plus Ministry of Finance). 
-Clarity on the specification of the role of each agency in data collection and analysis to avoid 
the duplication of the efforts. 
Source: Author  
C.3. Summary of Probabilistic CBA  
(See also Annex C for theoretical and technical backgrounds and a detailed case study) 
Overview: Cost benefit analysis (CBA) is an established tool in economics. This analysis can be used for both 
sectorial and project analysis. Many countries already adopt cost benefit analysis as a requirement of large-scale 
public investment projects. In this initiative, probabilistic CBA was applied to account for the benefits of risk 
reduction. The benefit is estimated by measuring how much annual average loss (AAL) will be reduced after the 
investment. As probabilistic risk assessment for flood has not been developed, historic disaster loss data was 
used as input (backward- looking probabilistic CBA).  
Case study of housing retrofitting against flooding and cyclonic wind: Probabilistic Cost- Benefit Analysis 
was performed regarding flood/wind-retrofitting options in Union des Comores. Assuming that residential assets 
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make up 53% of the total and that retrofitting against flood (including cyclone-induced rain) does not contribute to 
retrofitting against wind, and that all housings are in the category of low design quality and retrofitting would result 
in high design quality, it was estimated that the cost of retrofitting is 16% (11% for flood and 5% for wind). In this 
case, retrofitting all housings against wind and rain appears to be cost-inefficient with a net present value of USD 
-113 million.   
However, there are a number of factors regarding the data and the assumptions that potentially limit the validity 
of the figures found in this report. For example, we have no concrete data on house value. The only metric 
provided from potential housing value comes from an exposed asset file, which shows 53% of the national assets 
falling into the residential sector. It is unclear if this figure is the value of the housings itself (which is the 
assumption used in this analysis), or if it includes all of the assets owned by households. If the latter is the case, 
then the estimation of the value of housings would be significantly over-estimated, resulting in an overestimation 
of both ALL and total retrofitting costs.  
The second issue is with regards to the project retrofitting costs. With no local estimate, the cost of retrofitting for 
wind and flood could be significantly different than the figures taken from previous findings based in other 
countries. For example, in this study, we used the figures from Woodruff (2008) which estimated that cost of 
raising the floor heights of housings to be anywhere from 11-50% of the housing value in Samoa. We also have 
no information on flood exposure in the country, which significantly limits the quality of present analysis. 
It is also important to keep in mind that the present assessment did not take into account many of the indirect and 
intangible losses, such as loss due to business interruption and any reduction in land values that may result due 
to frequent disasters. These are clear limitations of this current analysis and further studies are certainly needed 
to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of our analysis. 
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6. Policy Recommendations29 
 
Regarding the analysis highlighted in chapters on disaster loss and disaster risk above, the main conclusions are 
as follows:  
• Economic loss (physical and agriculture) totals USD 9.8 million at 2012 prices. 
 
• Geographically, the economic risk is observed in all islands. Absolute cyclone loss was most 
concentrated in Anjouan and relative loss in Moheli. 
 
• Union des Comores has often confronted both natural hazards such as flooding, fire, volcano, storms 
and cyclones, forest fires and (mainly technological) hazards like transport accidents, industrial pollution, 
fire, and epidemics. However, the most important direct losses that Union des Comores experiences 
from disaster events are those that occur after cyclones and flooding.  
 
The greatest challenge to go forward in addressing DRR/CCA and in mainstreaming Risk-Sensitive Public 
Investment is the lack of pertinent policies in the fields of agriculture, road and public infrastructure, health and 
environment. Sensitization of key decision makers is crucial; short training courses on DRR concepts and its 
importance in poverty reduction and development are critical. Also, the challenge to mainstream DRR is budget 
constraints. Though some decision makers are sometimes aware of the importance of DRR, the lack of 
resources has resulted in a focus first on priorities and emergencies. The opportunity costs of implementing DRR 
measures have been considered too high. 
Given these conclusions, the national risk profile and the lack of financial resources in the country, 
mainstreaming DRR in the budget planning process needs to be made more effective by starting with the 
following noteworthy priorities:    
• Awareness raising of all stakeholder on risk reduction and risk sensitive public investment 
 
• Stronger collaboration between the DRM entity, Ministry of Finance and other key sectorial ministries 
with the implication of civil society 
 
• Continuous capacity building on risk terminology and concepts, loss and risk information 
management and economic analysis by all stakeholders, including Ministry of Finance 
  
                                                            
29 This chapter was drafted by Lezlie C. Moriniere, with inputs from the ISLANDS Country team of Union des Comores. 
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Annex A: Risk-Sensitive Budget Review (RSBR) 30 
A. Overview 
The objective of the Risk-Sensitive Budget Review (hereafter called budget review) is to explore the gap between 
risk level and DRR investment (Figure 40). While CATSIM analysis outlined in Annex B will identify the financial 
gap year by comparing risk and financial capacity of the country, the budget review aims to clarify what has 
already been done to reduce risk. It also checks the balance between disaster risk reduction/mitigation, 
preparedness, response and reconstruction. Understanding the costs of response and reconstruction is an 
opportunity to re-consider the importance of DRR investment. 
 
Figure 40: Objective of budget review 
 
Source: Author 
Budget review is expected to bring about improved efficiency and accountability. Systematic budget analysis 
requires the cooperation of all stakeholders, thereby improving budget coordination and leading to a more 
effective use of financial resources. Budget review clarifies the current level of DRR activities and enables a 
thorough analysis of the gap to explain how much funding is required for further DRR implementation. 
In the HFA Monitor, Indicator 1.2 aims to monitor the DRR budget. However, not many countries report their 
budgets due to lack of monitoring system for their DRR budget. Table 12 below, shows the reported value in 
selected countries. While we need to be cautious when comparing the values across countries, due to the 
application of different counting methods, this table shows that out of five countries, three invested significantly 
more in relief and reconstruction than in DRR and prevention. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
30 This chapter were drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR). 
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Table 12: DRR Budget in selected countries (% of total budget) 
Country Year DRR and 
prevention 
(%) 
Relief and 
Reconstruction     
(%) 
Total        
(%) 
Belarus 2013 0.160 0.160 0.320 
Ecuador 2013 0.300 1.600 1.900 
Indonesia 2013 0.286 0.413 0.699 
Mozambique 2013 4.610 0.350 4.960 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2012 0.100 1.000 1.100 
Source: Author based on HFA Progress Report for each country 
In response to the need for DRM budget monitoring, several initiatives have progressed to date. The first effort 
has been to create a consolidated budget line for DRM. This approach has mainly been taken in Latin American 
countries.  For example, Columbia established the Adaptation Fund (2010). Mexico has been utilizing the Natural 
Disaster Prevention Fund (FOPREDEN), the Natural Disaster Fund (FONDEN) and the Fund for Assistance of 
the Affected Rural Populations by Climate Contingencies (FAPRAC). Peru has also established a National 
Budgetary Programme for Vulnerability Reduction and Emergency Response. 
The second effort is to assign codes to budgetary line items that indicate DRM measures. This is promoted by 
the World Bank and OECD in partnership with the UNISDR; they propose the “DRM marker” to monitor DRM 
elements in Official Development Assistances (ODAs) which are registered in OECD’s Credit Reporting 
System31. DRM marking allows the monitoring of donors’ policy objectives in relation to DRM in each aid activity. 
Compared to consolidated budget lines, the DRM marker is a less drastic reform and has potential to be the first 
and simplest analytical step toward risk-sensitive public investment. Therefore, the DRM Marker, with some 
adjustment, was applied to Union des Comores. 
  
                                                            
31 The Rio Marker monitors CCA aid activity since 2011. DRM Marker is proposed using the similar methodology. 
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B. DRM Marker 
The DRM marker allows (a) capturing “embedded” investment by distinguishing between stand-alone versus 
mainstreamed DRR investment (e.g. retrofitting in school renovation program), (b) strengthening the ability to 
analyse, measure and report activities in DRR, and (c) improving regulatory conditions to facilitate tracking of 
budgetary allocations and expenditure in DRR and even (d) tracking pre-disaster (DRR) versus post-disaster 
(relief/reconstruction) investments, with simple addition of a rule. 
The first eligibility criterion for an element to be marked is that DRM must be included in “the programme 
objectives” (Figure 41). The DRM element is defined as any “strategy, policy, effort or measure that improves the 
understanding of disaster risk, fosters disaster risk reduction or transfer, and promotes continuous improvement 
in disaster preparedness, response and recovery practices” (OECD, 201432). If a budgeted activity meets any of 
those elements, it becomes “marked” as DRM.  
The second level criterion is to examine how important the DRM objective is to drive implementation of the 
activity. The exact question is “would the aid activity have been undertaken without that DRR objective?” If the 
answer is affirmative, then it is marked as “significant” and if negative, it is marked as “principal”33. 
Figure 41: DRM Marker process 
 
Source: OECD (2014) 
By applying this DRM Marker methodology across time and space, it is expected that data homogeneity and 
comparability will be assured. Furthermore, especially by introducing the “significant” category, incentives to 
mainstream DRM in development activities become visible. In the past, DRM has conventionally been delivered 
through stand-alone projects. However with progress achieved in implementing the HFA, more governments 
have been recognizing development mechanisms and instruments as important to reduce risks and strengthen 
resilience. It becomes more important to monitor a wide number of DRR related projects and investments 
embedded across different sectors either at central or local government levels in order to provide comprehensive 
overview of DRR policies.   
In spite of such benefits, it is necessary to clarify the limitations of the DRM marker. The DRM marker cannot 
quantify the exact amount of DRM activity and only provides a best estimate. It is often impossible to extract a 
DRM element from overall programmes/projects, therefore overall programme/project budget are registered, 
leading to over-estimation of DRM budget. Furthermore, because the objective of the activity is the only criteria 
used to “mark” the budget item as DRM, if policy makers are unaware of DRM benefits, the activity will never be 
                                                            
32 OECD, 2014. A Proposal to Establish a Policy Marker for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in the OECD DAC Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS). 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT%282014%293&docLanguage=En 
33 Still certain level of ambiguity remains. For example, distinction between principal and significant is not clear and might 
require subjective judgment. However this is a notable progress for systematic monitoring. 
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“marked“. While it is clear to most that flood control and early warning are DRR policies, policy makers may not 
naturally recognize the contributions to reduce disaster vulnerability made, for example, by poverty reduction and 
ecosystem restoration. In this regard, a DRM Marker system may miss DRR elements embedded in all 
development activities. The DRR activities, which must have DRR elements but are not recognized as DRR, 
might underline an awareness gap of policy makers in the given sector. 
C. The budget review methodology: Application of DRM marker 
In applying the methodology of the DRM Marker in a risk-sensitive budget review, the following three steps were 
taken (Figure 42, Annex A-1 for more details). The first step is to define what should be monitored, i.e. the scope 
of the budget review. In the DRM Marker, the target was ODA data stored in OECD Credit Reporting System. 
However, in budget review, the scope of review needs to be clarified in the given context.  
Then, the second step is to mark budget line items as significant and principal using DRM Marker criteria, count 
the budget in each item and sum up the value. In this step, sub-categories based on DRM elements is added to 
the original DRM Marker to show the balance between DRR (including prevention and preparedness) and 
disaster management (response and recovery). The last step aims to assess the resulting gap by comparing 
budget with risk. This analysis enables the identification of lessons to feed into the following year’s budget. 
Figure 42: Risk sensitive budget review process 
 
Source: Author 
In defining the scope of budget review, the following four aspects need to be clarified. The first is the coverage of 
monitored entities. Public sector consists of general government and state corporations. General government 
consists of central and sub-national governments. In developing countries, donor finance is also a non-negligible 
component of budget. 
The second is whether to monitor budget or expenditure. In the context of developing countries, very often 
expenditure is far below the budget especially in capital investment due to its disposal of donor relationship.  
The third point is whether to monitor current or capital budget/expenditure. Most infrastructures are classified 
under capital budget/expenditure, with sometimes multi-year budget commitment. Considering the importance of 
DRR in public investment, monitoring capital budget/expenditure is necessary. At the same time, current 
budget/expenditure includes important items such as expenses for training and early warning. Ideally, both 
should be monitored.  
Lastly, there is often no disagreement in including activities targeted at geological (e.g. earthquake, tsunami, 
landslide), meteorological (e.g. cyclone, heat wave) and hydrological hazards (e.g. flood, landslide, drought). 
However, depending on countries context, epidemics and other hazards may also be included. 
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In Step 2, while the marking process based on DRM Marker methodology highlights investments in DRM in 
monetary terms, a parallel “tagging” process categorizes each marked activity as one of four components of 
DRM:  prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and reconstruction. Tagging is most easily represented as 
percentages in each category, the four categories summing to 100% of marked elements34.  
When each marked item is “tagged” in this way, we can start to understand how investments are distributed 
before and after a disaster. As countries can demonstrate more and more investment on the side of DRR 
(including prevention and preparedness), they can prove that they are accountable for risk reduction. As the 
value rises in components tagged as DRR, it will normally become evident that less funding is required in the 
post-disaster phase (response and reconstruction). 
  
                                                            
34 In reality, the four components overlap. For example, some elements of reconstruction may be devoted to future disaster risk 
prevention/mitigation. However, for simplification, items are classified and tagged for four components based on their greatest 
contribution. 
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Annex A-1. CHECKLIST for a risk-sensitive budget review 
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CHECKLIST to CONDUCT a RISK-SENSITIVE BUDGET REVIEW (RSBR) 
1. DETERMINE WHAT SHOULD BE COUNTED 
a. IDENTIFY YEAR / PERIOD that is appropriate and feasible 
EXAMPLE: last fully-completed year or current year underway 
ADVICE: Start with a single year, add other periods later, as feasible. 
b. DETERMINE COVERAGE 
EXAMPLE: all public sector (general and state corporations) or only General budget (central and/or sub-national budgets) 
ADVICE: All public sector is desirable, but start with central budget and budget of national disaster management entity before moving onto other budgets. 
Smaller countries should be able to review all. 
c. IDENTIFY BASIS FOR REVIEW 
EXAMPLE 1: budget or expenditure? 
ADVICE: if difference between two is large, go with expenditure; if small, go with budget. 
EXAMPLE 2: investment (capital) and/or consumption (current)? 
ADVICE: ideal to use both, usually reported separately in budget 
2. OBTAIN COPIES of budgets covering all elements determined above 
EXAMPLE: hard-copy or electronic copy—with ‘objectives’ stipulated per line item in enough detail to conduct next steps 
ADVICE: review / study guidance for DRM Marker, taking note of the “eligibility criteria” discussion on pp3-4: (Review document entitled: DAC Working 
Party on Development Finance Statistics, A Proposal to Establish a Policy Marker for DRM in the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, 2014) 
3. MARK and TAG BUDGETARY ELEMENTS  
a. DRM MARKING: go through the budget(s) line by line, asking the question(s) at each line:  
• “do any objectives of the budgeted activity meet any ‘eligibility criteria’ of the DRM marker? 
• “If yes, would the budgeted activity have been undertaken without that DRM objective?” 
ADVICE: Using spreadsheet, record total of the budget activity in three categories: Principle (2), Significant (1) and not marked (0) for easy summing 
b. DRM TAGGING: go through the budget(s) again line by line, to categorize each MARKED activity by scheme in 3a above: “what percentage of total 
MARKED items fit best under prevention/mitigation, preparedness, relief and reconstruction?” 
ADVICE: Work with DRM entity in your country to determine the best categorization 
EXAMPLE: the most common standard is: 1. Prevention/mitigation, 2. Preparedness, 3. Response and 4. Reconstruction 
4. CALCULATE AND COMPARE DRM INVESTMENT 
a. Sum DRM/CCA investment per marker and DRM sub-category 
b. Calculate gap by comparing sum with Risk/Loss data (Comp 1/2) 
c. Document lessons learned 
d. Time allowing, repeat all of the above with additional years, budgets, sectors, etc.  
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Annex B. CATSIM Assessment35 
A. Overview 
Generally regarded as the ‘insurer of last resort,’ national governments assume primary responsibility in providing 
response, recovery and reconstruction resources in times of disasters (Mechler, 2004).  Governments play an 
important role in the post-disaster period, conducting timely and accurate damage assessments, devising 
rehabilitation plans, and financing and executing rehabilitation projects. Reconstruction is often very costly. 
Appropriate assessment of existing risk and contingency liability, and reducing risk and preparing for fiscal 
contingency as much as feasible before events occur is therefore of paramount importance for government’s 
strategic decision-making, planning and resource allocation.  
To respond to such needs in 2006 the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) invented the 
“CATSIM” (Catastrophe Simulation), an interactive simulation tool to build capacity of policy makers to estimate 
and reduce public sector financial vulnerability. The model has been applied to Madagascar in 2011 and to 
several other countries. 
The CATSIM model consists of five-steps (See Table 13): In the first step, direct risk assessment is performed 
integrating information regarding the probability of natural hazard occurrence, the level of exposure and physical 
vulnerability (see Hochrainer-Stigler, 2012 for details). Direct risk is expressed in terms of economic value of 
asset at risk and return periods of natural hazards. In this initiative, we utilized the data collected in Components 
2 to the maximum degree. 
In the second step, public finance preparedness and vulnerability are determined by the national government’s 
current ability to raise internal and external funds for disaster response and reconstruction ex-ante or ex-post. 
The government’s ability to raise necessary fiscal means are typically constrained by a number of economic and 
institutional factors such as the country’s current level of public deficit and cumulative debt, capacity to raise tax 
revenue and its ability to borrow from domestic and international credit markets. 
In the third step, the government’s current level of public finance preparedness is evaluated against the disaster 
risk. The model quantifies the notion of fiscal ‘resource gap year’—i.e. the return period at which the national 
government’s current level of fiscal preparedness will be insufficient against the risk it faces.  
The potential occurrence of a fiscal resource gap and its longer-term growth implications are appraised through 
macroeconomic modelling in step four. Using the Monte-Carlo simulation approach, the model quantifies 
probabilistic macroeconomic growth trajectories based on the existing degrees of natural disaster risk and public 
finance preparedness. 
Finally, a range of risk management options is evaluated against the costs and benefits in the fifth and final step. 
Governments may adopt a number of ex-ante and ex-post measures to prepare for the disaster risk, including 
structural mitigation, contingency fund, catastrophe insurance, catastrophe bonds, and contingent credit 
arrangements.   
Since Union des Comores has not conducted CATSIM to date, as a first trial, this initiative has implemented only 
Steps 1 to 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
35 This chapter was drafted by Junko Mochizuki, Stefan Hochrainer, Keith Williges, and Reinhard Mechler, Risk Policy and 
Vulnerability Program, International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA).  Input was provided by UNISDR. 
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Table 13: 5 Step CATSIM Modules 
Steps Tasks 
1. Direct Risk Assessment To estimate economic asset at risk and return periods of natural hazards. 
2. Fiscal Resilience 
Assessment 
To assess the country’s current fiscal resources availability and preparedness  
3. Fiscal and Economic 
Vulnerability 
To estimate a ‘fiscal resources gap year’ combining step 1 & 2 
4. Economic impact 
Assessment  
To estimate indirect impacts in terms of potential risks to macroeconomic growth  
5. Risk 
Management/Reduction 
Option Assessment 
To evaluate the risk management options  
Source: Author 
B. CATSIM Analysis in Union des Comores 
Step 1: Direct Risk Assessment  
This study evaluated the ability of government to manage potential fiscal and economic risk arising from cyclone 
(wind) and earthquake combined. Probabilistic risk assessment using the CAPRA GIS software shows that Union 
des Comores faces considerable disaster risk relative to the size of their economy.  
This study evaluated the fiscal resources gap using both current CAPRA estimates and statistical estimates 
available from Hochrainer-Stigler et al (2014). In general, the estimates based on CAPRA shows lower loss 
estimates than those of Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2014) (Table 14). 
Table 14: Estimated PML at varying return periods (in USD million)36 
 
Return 
period 
Union des Comores 
(CAPRA estimate) 
Union des 
Comores(Hochrainer-
Stigler et al. 2014) 
5 0.1 - 
10 1.0 - 
20 3.6 9.4 
50 13.3 19.8 
100 27.1 42.5 
500 66.5 317 
1000 85.0 - 
AAL 1.07 - 
Source: Author 
The government is generally not responsible to provide all reconstruction needs because private households and 
businesses will assume responsibility of their own reconstruction needs. We assume that the governments 
assume the following responsibility in case of a disaster: 
• The Union des Comores government will be responsible to finance reconstruction of public assets, 
including roads, bridges, schools and hospitals, etc. (Explicit liability). 
• The Union des Comores government will extend partial support for private relief and recovery including 
provision of support to the poor (Implicit liability). 
•  
Total contingent liabilities of Union des Comores Government were estimated as outlined in Table 15. 
 
 
 
                                                            
36 The data collected from Component 2 was later revised to reflect new GAR 15 methodology. Chapter 2 was revised to 
update the data, but given short time frame, we could note reiterate the CATSIM assessment based on new data. The 
inconsistency with Chapter 2 stems from this issue. 
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Table 15: Estimated Government Direct and Contingent Liability 
Item Values in USD billion References 
Total Capital Stock 3.3 Penn World Table (2014) 
Public Capital (a) 0.98 Assumed as 30% of total capital 
stock based on Hochrainer-
Stigler (2012) 
Private Capital  2.3 Assumed as 70% of total capital 
stock based on Hochrainer-
Stigler (2012) 
Relief Spending (b) 0.65 Assumed as 20% of total capital 
stock based on Hochrainer-
Stigler (2012) 
Governments Total 
Liability (a+b) 
1.6 N/A 
Source: Author 
Step 2: Fiscal Resilience Assessment  
The options to finance reconstruction and recovery may be divided into: i) ex-ante and ii) ex-post resources 
depending on whether arrangements are made prior to or after a disaster event. The below are some of the ways 
in which governments typically raise fund to finance reconstruction: 
Ex-Ante Resources 
• Preparing contingency budget line 
• Establishing reserve fund 
• Arranging contingent credit 
• Obtaining insurance for public infrastructure 
• Issuing catastrophe bonds 
 
Ex-Post Resources 
• Diverting funds from other budget expenditures 
• Raising additional tax 
• Obtaining credits from central bank 
• Borrowing and issuing domestic bonds 
• Receiving international assistance 
• Borrowing from multilateral finance institutions 
• Borrowing and issuing bonds in international market  
 
In this study, we have estimated fiscal resources availability based on available economic and fiscal statistics. 
Table 16 provides an overview of the estimated availability of ex-post resources such as international assistance, 
budget diversion, domestic bonds and credit, and international / multilateral financial institution (MFI) bonds.  
We did not consider the tax option because this is largely considered as infeasible or undesirable option by Union 
des Comores. We also did not consider ex-ante options because of data availability issues.  
 
Table 16: Estimated Ex-post Fiscal Resources Availability 
Sources Assumptions Value 
International Donor Assistance 10.4% of public liability 
based on international 
average37 
10.4% of public liability 
Diversion from budget 5%>deficit, then 0 
5%<deficit, 
then 5% of total revenue 
0 
Domestic Bonds and Credit 1% of gross domestic USD 0.97 million 
                                                            
37 This value depends on the size of disaster. Therefore, we do not have any single value. In CATSIM, the availability for each 
scenario is calculated using this percentage. 
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credit from private bank 
MFI/ International bond market 
borrowing 
SDR allocation USD 9.6 million 
Total excluding international 
assistance 
 USD 10.6 million 
Source: Author 
Assumptions for fiscal resource availability 
International assistance 
International assistance, the amount of money made available to a country post-event in the form of donations 
from other countries and aid organizations, is assumed to be 10.4% of damages, based on regression analysis of 
historic data from Freeman et al (2002).  
Diversion from budget 
Budget diversion, representing the amount of funding from the central government’s budget which can be re-
directed and focused towards recovery, is assumed to be only possible if a government has a budget surplus or 
small deficit. For this analysis, we assume that countries with a 5% or larger budget deficit relative to GDP are 
unable to divert funding; as Union des Comores does satisfy this criteria, available funds for diversion are 
calculated as zero. Data for this calculation are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Domestic bonds and credit 
After an event, a nation has the possibility of trying to finance recovery via domestic credit, either by printing 
money, issuing bonds, or borrowing from domestic sources. A pitfall to this avenue of funding is the risk of 
increasing the total stock of domestic credit, which could crowd out private sector credit and lead to more 
monetary expansion and increasing inflation (World Bank, 2011). For this reason, we assume that a government 
will be limited in this regard to a maximum of 1% of gross domestic credit from private banks, the data being 
sourced from World Bank Development Indicators. There is high uncertainty whether the domestic credit market 
can be accessed and these estimates deserve further verification. 
Multi-lateral financial institution (MFI) / International bond market borrowing 
A further option for financing reconstruction and recovery comes from borrowing on international markets and 
from multi-lateral financing institutions. The International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which 
represent an international reserve asset, is used as a baseline estimate for how much international funding could 
be available post-event. SDRs are based on four currencies (the euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and U.S. 
dollar), and can be exchanged for usable currencies (IMF, 2014).  
Step 3: Estimating potential “fiscal resources gap”  
Combining direct risk and fiscal resources availability information obtained in previous steps, this section 
estimates the governments’ potential fiscal resources gap year — the return period at which the government will 
face difficulty in raising sufficient funds for reconstruction (Figure 43). Given the considerable uncertainty 
regarding risk estimates, the result should be interpreted with caution and further studies are certainly advisable 
to validate assumptions in Steps 1 and 2. 
While the concept of ‘fiscal resources gap’ illustrates the snapshot estimate of the country’s resource availability, 
it is important to note that a large proportion of resources that will be used to meet this one-time disaster event is 
loan-based, suggesting that there will be a longer-term cost of repayment of these loans. While the precise fiscal 
and macroeconomic implications of such longer-term impacts must be analysed in a dynamic CATSIM 
framework, it is important to keep in mind that there are a number of costs associated with each option. In 
particular, the opportunity cost of diverting resources away from other development projects must be weighed 
carefully with the benefit of resources spent on disaster reconstruction and recovery.  
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Figure 43: Display of results of fiscal resources gap year 
 
Source: Author  
Assuming an AAL of USD 1.07 million (0.17% of GDP), Union des Comores was found to face a fiscal resources 
gap at year 77 (CAPRA estimate) (Figure 44). Based on the loss distribution available from Hochrainer-Stigler 
(2014), a fiscal resource gap year was estimated at 56 years (Figure 45). Based on the CAPRA estimate, the 
reconstruction and recovery capital needs are estimated at: USD 1.85 million (20 year event), USD 6.90 million 
(50 year event) and USD 14.0 million (100 year event) and USD 34 million (500 year event) respectively. MFI and 
international borrowing constitute a larger portion of reconstruction and recovery costs as return period increases 
where above 70 % of the costs will be financed through these means for the 50 year and 100 year events. The 
financing gaps are expected to increase to USD 1.96 million in the 100-year event and USD 20 million in the 500-
year event (Figure 46). 
INPUT:                   
Financing sources 
INPUT:                           
Risk Information 
OUTPUT: Fiscal 
resources Gap Year 
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Figure 44: Fiscal resources gap year estimate for Union des Comores (CAPRA estimate) 
 
Source: Author 
Figure 45: Fiscal resources gap year estimate for Union des Comores (based on Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 
2014) 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 46: Fiscal resource gaps for Union des Comores 
 
Source: Author  
Conclusion: Toward risk layered approach  
The government is encouraged to take a ‘risk layered management’ approach where resources are allocated 
based on the varying levels of risk facing the country, with a priority given to reducing existing risk and preventing 
the creation of new risks in the extensive risk layer (Figure 47).  The CATSIM analysis conducted from Steps 1 to 
3 has illustrated the need for improved management of disaster risk in Union des Comores.  
For Union des Comores, the combination of risk reduction and risk financing will be most effective to manage 
fiscal risk from cyclone wind and earthquake risks in the country. Given that Union des Comores does have 
specific budget lines allocated for disaster risk reduction nor contingency budget that can be carried-over across 
fiscal years, that the establishment of a reserve fund where a certain percentage of unspent money can be used 
for DRR investment activities may provide good risk management strategies that can cover the mid-layer of risk.  
Figure 47: Risk Layering Approach 
  
Source: Author 
Union des Comores 56-77 years 
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Further challenge: Data gaps and way forward 
The present study identified data gaps and sources of uncertainty regarding fiscal risk assessment. The present 
studies did not fully account for indirect effects of disaster damage, and further studies are needed to quantify 
and evaluate the indirect risks caused by disaster damage. 
Risk assessments of additional hazards including cyclone (rain/storm surge), floods, volcanic eruption etc. are 
certainty needed to conclude on a more comprehensive assessment of fiscal risks. 
Given the relatively short period of data availability, high uncertainty can be expected of catastrophic risks with 
return periods of above 500. It is advisable, therefore, further data collection, validation and analysis performed in 
an iterative fashion to reduce the range of uncertainty.   
A technical and institutional support package is necessary to establish iterative risk management system in Union 
des Comores and other IOC countries (Table 17). In terms of technical needs, knowledge regarding probabilistic 
risk assessment and economic assessment tools (CATSIM) would be needed along with general awareness of 
risk related concepts and statistics. Given the limited availability of risk experts in IOC countries, a regional 
approach to training and capacity building (e.g. regional workshop for training of trainers/ regional sharing of risk 
knowledge experts, etc.) may be an effective way to leverage local capacity and resources. Institutional support 
for iterative management should be embedded in the existing DRR/CCA policy framework of Union des 
Comores.  
It is important to discuss and update fiscal resilience parameter and value at critical time, for example, when 
administration changes or after disaster. Financing mechanism for disaster management (see Table 6 in Chapter 
5) should be checked regularly. Defining government liability more concretely is also recommended. 
Some of the important policy questions to ask in Union des Comores would be: 
-­‐ What is the desirable level of fiscal preparedness in the country? What would be the policy goal in mid 
to long-term (maintain or reduce fiscal gap etc)? 
-­‐ How can you balance the need for risk reduction and risk-transfer? 
-­‐ What are the priority areas of action regarding DRR in your country? 
-­‐ What are tangible milestones and goals in the DRR priority areas in your country?    
-­‐ What further risk assessment is needed to achieve the goals of DRR priority areas in your country? 
 
Table 17: Identified data gaps, technical and institutional capacity needs 
Data needs: 
-Risk information regarding additional hazards such as flood, cyclone (rain & storm surge), 
drought will improve the scope of analysis 
-Uncertainty regarding larger return period events is high given the relatively short period of 
data availability (In Component 1, loss data was collected since 1980). Further data collection 
will improve accuracy especially for higher return period events 
Technical capacity 
needs: 
-Technical training on risk assessment and economic modeling including CAPRA and 
CATSIM training.  
-Further sensitization of risk-based thinking. General familiarity of risk based terms such as 
the annual average loss, the probable maximum loss, exceedance probability must be 
explained to decision-makers.  
Institutional capacity 
needs: 
-Coordination, where both risk and socio-economic data are jointly collected and managed by 
relevant agencies (DRM agency plus Ministry of Finance). 
-Clarity on the specification of the role of each agency in data collection and analysis to avoid 
the duplication of the efforts. 
Source: Author  
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Annex C. Probabilistic Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) for Union des 
Comores38 
 
A. Overview 
 
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) is an established tool in economics. This analysis can be used for both sectorial and 
project analysis. Many countries already adopt cost benefit analysis as a requirement of large-scale public 
investment projects. Although imperfect, CBA is one of the most important tools for financial decision making 
around the world. 
There are two important general objectives in CBA. One is to improve efficiency of the project selection, because 
CBA facilitates the rational comparison of available options. The second objective is to improve accountability. In 
democratized countries, it is increasingly important that government explains why a given project is selected. This 
will also contribute to reduce corruption and in some cases, lessen inappropriate interference of politicians. In this 
regard, it is important to disclose the methodology and the original data for the analysis. 
We can apply this methodology into public investment projects that contributes to DRR. However, there is a 
unique concern to be considered. For usual projects, the benefits can be tangible and visible. For example, in the 
case of a public transportation project, we can estimate the number of passengers and total fees paid by 
passengers. On the other hand, in a DRR project, the main benefit is avoided loss. In this case, we need to 
somehow estimate the benefit relating with an event not occurring. This introduces technical difficulty in DRR cost 
benefit analysis. 
CBA can measure the impact of policy on DRR at sectorial or project level. While a budget review and CATSIM 
provide overviews of the country and help raise awareness of the effectiveness of DRR investment, CBA can 
provide more detailed insight for decision-making.  
Depending on precise objectives and the resolution of available data, different levels of CBA are possible (Table 
18). If the objective is an informational study to provide overview over costs and benefits, resource requirements 
(e.g. data, time and human capacity) are relatively not so demanding. However, if the objective is project 
appraisal, the resource requirements can be enormous in terms of financial and time aspects. 
Table 18: Cost benefit analysis at different scopes 
Product Objectives Resource 
requirements 
Informational study Provide a broad overview over costs 
and benefits 
+ 
Pre-project appraisal Singling out most effective measures ++ 
Project appraisal Detailed evaluation of project +++ 
Ex-post evaluation Evaluation of project after completion ++ 
Source: Mechler (2008) 
CBA is based on the following simple principle: If the benefit-to-cost (B/C) ratio (benefit divided by cost) is 
greater than one, invest. Comparing multiple projects, the higher the B/C ratio, the more preferable the project. 
Also, where the net present value (NPV) (benefit minus cost) is positive, invest. The larger the NPV, the more 
preferable the project. 
                                                            
38 Sections A and B of this chapter were drafted by Kazuko Ishigaki (UNISDR). The Section C was drafted by Callahan Egan, 
Junko Mochizuki, Stefan Hochrainer and Reinhard Mechler, Risk Policy and Vulnerability Program, International Institute for 
Applied System Analysis (IIASA). 
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However, there are complex methodological problems that survive to date with no consensus of even modern 
economists (e.g. how to set the discount rate? How to assign monetary value to immeasurable, intangible 
items?). Furthermore, there are concerns regarding who conducts the CBA in order to retain objectiveness and 
accountability.  Administrative costs for implementing CBA are also a concern for government.  
When we assess from HFA Monitor the current status of CBA applications to DRR related projects, two issues 
arise. The first is that disaster risk is very often not accounted for in CBA for public investments, for example 
investment in infrastructure for transportation, education and health. The second issue is that direct risk 
preventive projects such as flood control infrastructure are often implemented without the routine grounding of a 
CBA framework.  
The strength of the CBA is its ability to compare several options. For example, in reducing flood loss, the practical 
issue that financially constrained governments often face is how to choose between competing options such as 
Early Warning Systems (EWS), evacuation planning, sea wall construction, building retrofitting etc. Or in 
countries that face several hazards, questions are whether to prioritize risk reduction for earthquakes, floods, or 
cyclones, etc. CBA is a useful tool to provide insight on such prioritization issues.  
Figure 48 summarizes examples of CBA to DRR policy implemented in several studies. We need to interpret the 
figure with caution because it is based on several studies and different contexts, however the interesting point is 
that in all of the featured projects benefit exceeds cost.  
Figure 48: Benefit to cost ratio of DRR policies 
 
Source: Wethli 2013 cited by the World Bank 
In this initiative, probabilistic CBA was applied. The most important difference between probabilistic and non-
probabilistic CBA is that the former accounts for the probabilistic benefits of risk reduction. While non-probabilistic 
CBA answers the question “what is the cost and benefit of sea wall construction if a cyclone of a 50-year return 
period occurs?”, probabilistic CBA answers the question “what is the cost and benefit of sea wall construction 
given that cyclones of different sizes occur stochastically with different return periods?”. 
Probabilistic cost benefit analysis based on probabilistic risk assessment (forward looking probabilistic CBA) has 
been applied in several cases. When and where probabilistic risk assessment has not developed well, 
economists use historic disaster loss data (backward- looking probabilistic CBA) (Table 19). Now that more 
countries have risk profiles, more accurate forward-looking benefit estimation is increasingly possible.  
 
 
 74 
Table 19: Forward-looking and backward-looking assessment 
Type of 
assessment 
Methodology Data requirements Cost and 
applicability 
Forward 
looking 
assessment 
(future risk 
based) 
Estimate risk as a 
function of hazard, 
exposure and 
vulnerability 
Local and asset specific 
data on hazard, exposure 
and vulnerability 
More accurate, but 
time and data 
intensive 
Backward 
looking 
assessment 
(past loss 
based) 
Use past losses as 
manifestations of past 
risk, then update to 
current risk 
Data on past events and 
information on changes in 
hazard exposure and 
vulnerability 
 
Note: At least four credible 
data points of past loss are 
required 
Rougher estimate, but 
more realistic for 
developing country 
contexts 
Source: Mechler 2005, underlined by UNISDR. 
In this initiative in the IOC region, forward-looking CBA was applied for Madagascar and Mauritius and backward-
looking CBA was applied for Seychelles, Union des Comores and Zanzibar. 
B. Methodology of CBA 
CBA generally gets through five steps (Figure 49). CBA starts with setting project alternatives (Step 1). For 
example, when constructing dykes against flood, the government must choose the strength: how resilient should 
the dyke be? When planning dam building for river management, the government might need to decide between 
investing in two small dams or one big dam. It is also sometimes needed to compare investment and non-
investment.  
Step 2 is to estimate the benefit of policy. This is the most difficult step for DRR projects that will be explained 
below. Step 3 is to calculate benefit to cost ratio or/and net present value. Once benefit is defined and estimated, 
this is very simple. Step 4 is to carry out a sensitivity analysis to consider the possible variation in results due to 
the uncertainty of input variables (e.g. inflation costs). 
Step 5 is distributional, or stakeholder analysis. CBA aims to measure the impact of a project on the society.  
Driven by strong economic assumption that the people who benefit will compensate for the loss to those who 
carry costs (Kaldor-Hicks Criterion), CBA does not consider distributional effects. However, reality is different. In 
making policy, distributional analysis is important to define stakeholders and care for those who may be 
negatively impacted. Therefore, in some cases, this complements the CBA. When those who benefit and those 
who pay for a project cost (including explicit and implicit) are self-evident, the government may be able to quantify 
the distributional impact. When it is not clear, qualitative analysis is implemented. 
Figure 49: 5 steps of CBA 
 
Source: Author 
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The expected benefits from DRR investments are diverse. These might include avoided direct damage or loss to 
physical assets, avoided indirect loss (e.g. avoided business interruption), and even purely psychological benefits 
(e.g. sense of safety). Although listing benefits in a systematic way is important, we are not necessarily able to 
estimate or calculate all of the listed benefits (Figure 50). 
Figure 50: Expected benefits from DRR investment 
 
Source: Author 
In estimating benefit, a main challenge is to assign monetary values to each expected benefit (Figure 51). If the 
benefits and costs have monetary values, the government can use them39. If the benefit is expressed by time 
(e.g. reduction of commuting time due to road infrastructure), the government needs to estimate the time gained 
and multiply it by the value of time (e.g. the average wage or minimum wage per hour).  
Environmental economists have long tackled the monetization of intangible benefits and developed many 
methods. For example, one method is directly asking people how much he/she is willing to pay if the project is 
implemented and estimating the monetary benefits from the answers to that question. 
Figure 51: Expected benefit classification 
                                                            
39 More technically told, economists advocates using opportunity costs instead of the monetary value 
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Source: Author 
It is important to keep it in mind that this CBA often reflects only partial benefits. In probabilistic CBA, estimation 
of avoided loss is based on probabilistic risk assessment (forward-looking CBA) or historic loss database 
(backward-looking CBA). In that sense, the scope of CBA analysis is defined by the scope of risk and loss data. 
For the case study described below, the risk assessment was limited to direct loss. Therefore, the CBA study 
also focuses only on the direct loss (written in bold in Figure 50). However, this is nonetheless a meaningful first 
step, because physical loss often needs to be recovered by reconstruction, which is very costly. 
The benefit is estimated by measuring how much annual average loss (AAL) will be reduced after the investment 
(Figure 52). In case of forward-looking CBA, the data can be input into software such as CAPRA to estimate the 
AAL before and after investment. In case of backward-looking CBA, AAL before and after investment is 
calculated by using statistical methods (Simpson rule40). 
Figure 52: Benefits in terms of reduced AAL 
 
Source: Author 
Estimating cost is relatively simple. Project cost and maintenance cost will be listed. Intangible costs (e.g. 
negative environmental impact) are sometimes also estimated. 
After having translated benefit and cost into monetary value, the discount rate will be a critical issue with a large 
impact on the result of a CBA41. Discount rates express time preferences within the society. Low discount rates 
will evaluate future benefit higher than the case applying high discount rate. For example the present value of 
USD 100 million in 100 years later is about USD 37 million in 1% discount rate, USD 2 million in 4% discount rate 
and only USD 0.1 million in 7% discount rate. The discount rate has more impact when the project sustains for a 
long time, which is often the case for big infrastructure.  
In CBA for public project, social discount rates are often defined by government (Table 20). If the government 
considers opportunity cost of capital, with more market based consideration, then discount rate tends to be 
                                                            
40 To estimate the AAL given probabilistic losses and return period data, the Simpson rule is applied.  If we know several data 
points of (return period, PML), depending on the amount of data points available, we can create probabilistic ranges between 
two data points and multiply the range by the estimated midpoint of loss in this given range. This is expressed by 
 AAL for range p1, p2= (p2-p1)*((L1+L2)/2) 
L1 and L2 represent the maximum loss associated with a given event. P1 and p2 are the probabilities associated with each 
event. By summing up the AAL for each interval, or range (p1 to p2, p2 to p3,..) we have a an estimate for the total AAL. 
41 When setting discount rate, it is important to consider the impact of expected inflation, if discount rate is 10%, but expected 
inflation rate is also 10%, the inflation rate will offset the discount rate. 
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higher. However, if the government wants to politically reflect social time preference to balance the benefit of 
current and future generation, the rate tends to be set low. The International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) 
recommends that governments adopt a low discount rate to recognize that benefits of future generations are 
equally important as those of current generation and future generation will be able to enjoy benefits from our 
actions today, in accordance with the concept of sustainable development (IPCC, 2012). It is important that 
government clarifies the rationale behind social discount rate setting; gaining accountability from the process is 
as important, or more, than the actual rate chosen. 
Table 20: Discount rates in several countries 
Country Social discount rate Rationale 
USA 7% 
3% 
4% (water) 
Opportunity cost of capital 
Social time preference 
Social time preference 
New Zealand 7% Opportunity cost of capital 
Japan 4% Opportunity cost of capital 
EU 3.5% Social time preference 
UK 3.5% Social time preference 
France  4% Social time preference 
Source: Satoru Otani et al (n.d.).  
The result of CBA is dependent on some critical variables. It is therefore always good to implement sensitivity 
analysis to observe how the result changes when we apply different values to those variables. For example, 
changing the social discount rate explained above will significantly change the result of the CBA. Construction 
periods and costs are also critical uncertain factors. Approving uncertainty and preparing several scenarios will 
strengthen the credibility of analysis instead of weakening it. 
While CBA is an explicit and rigorous accounting framework for systematic cost-efficient decision making and 
common yardstick with a money metric against which to measure projects for social improvement, there are 
some limitations. CBA often does not assess non-market values and indirect impacts, lacks accounting for the 
distribution of benefits and costs (due to Kaldor-Hicks Criterion), cannot resolve strong differences in value 
judgments, and is strongly influenced by discount rates. CBA should not be the sole criterion for evaluating 
policies and projects, but should be complemented by other, non-economic considerations. 
C. CASE STUDY: Housing retrofitting against flooding and cyclonic wind  
 
I Selection of Scenario 
 
We estimate the net benefits of retrofitting residential housings of different categories in Union des Comores 
against both flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and cyclone wind damage and compare Benefit/ Cost (B/C) 
ratios among several retrofitting scenarios. Given there is no probabilistic risk assessment of flood using hazard, 
exposure and vulnerability information, we decided to implement backward looking probabilistic CBA. We follow 
the general methodology for conducting cost-benefit analysis laid out by Mechler (2005). 
The selection of the scenario is based on the availability of loss data for Union des Comores. Flood risk on 
housing was selected based on discussions with the Comores team. However the available data on risk and 
losses was only for aggregated flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and cyclone (wind), therefore the analysis 
is targeted on retrofitting houses against both flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and cyclone wind damage.  
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II Key Assumptions 
1. Residential house value and retrofit options in Union des Comores.  
In order to conduct cost-benefit analysis of retrofitting housings and residential buildings, we needed to first 
identify the total value of housings and their exposed assets. We identified the total value of exposed assets in 
the residential sector to be USD 1,036 million based on the assessment of CAPRA which identified the value of 
the residential sector to be 53% of the total value of exposed assets in the Union des Comores and Hochrainer et 
al (2014) who identified the total capital stock value of the Union des Comores to be USD 1,952 million (Table 
21).    
 
Table 21: Sources and assumed value of exposed assets in the housing sector of Union des Comores (in 
USD) 
Source CAPRA Hochrainer et al 2014 Assumed 
Residential value 428,870,000 - 1,036,075,596 
Total asset value 808,100,000 1,952,230,000 1,952,230,000 
% Residential value 53% - 53% 
 
In this study, we assess the following two retrofitting options in Union des Comores: 
 
1. Flood risk reduction by raising floors of houses, which reduces potential losses from flooding 
(including cyclone-induced rain) to zero. 
2. Cyclone wind retrofitting, which raises the building quality from “low design quality” to “high design 
quality”. 
2. Flood and Wind losses for residential sector 
Hochrainer et al (2014) provides maximum losses with associated return periods42 from which we were able to 
estimate the average annual loss (AAL) due to flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and cyclone wind (Table 22)  
 
Table 22: AAL estimated from return periods and associated maximum losses (in million USD) due to 
flood and cyclone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hochrainer et al (2014) 
 
The expected annual loss is estimated applying the Simpson rule43. For example, based on the return periods 
identified, the expected loss up to a 20 year event is the cumulative probability of the 20 year event (0.95) minus 
the cumulative probability of the 0 year event (0) multiplied by the average loss between the 0 and 20 year 
events. In numerical terms: 
 EL(20-0 years)= (0.95-0)*((8.93+0)/2)= 4.2 
This process is then done for all other intervals. For the last interval, it is assumed for this CBA that losses 
associated with events of more than a 500 year return period will result in the same losses as the 500 year event. 
Therefore in the last interval, the expected loss is simply (1-0.998)*303.6, yielding the value of 0.6. Cumulating 
the losses for all events, the AAL for all sectors resulting from flood and wind damage is USD 6.95 million.  
                                                            
42 Disaster loss database developed in Component 1 could not be used because it was not complete at the timing of analysis. 
43 Please see the footnote 40 regarding Simpson rule. 
Return 
period 
Exceedance 
probability 
Maximum 
loss 
Expected 
annual loss 
0 1 0 0 
20 0.05 8.9 4.2 
50 0.02 19 0.4 
100 0.01 40.6 0.3 
500 0.002 303.6 1.3 
<500 0 303.6 0.6 
   AAL=6.95 
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However, this figure needs to be adjusted to losses for the residential sector only, as the CBA is done on 
retrofitting only residential housings. As our data is limited regarding losses specific to the residential sector, we 
had to assume that the amount of AAL to the residential sector would be exactly proportional to the percentage of 
value of the residential sector relative to all sectors. Since we assumed this to be 53% based on the exposed 
assets file provided, we assumed the AAL loss to the housing sector to be 6.95*(0.53)= USD 3.7 million.  
3. Costs 
As there is no readily available cost estimate for flood (including cyclone-induced rain) or wind retrofitting , this 
rough estimates were made based on existing literature. For flood retrofitting, a common option is raising the floor 
heights of existing housings. From Woodruff (2008) study conducted in Samoa, the cost estimates of raising the 
floor heights of housings can range anywhere from 11-50% of the house value (11% minimum, 31% medium, 
50% maximum). With regards to wind retrofitting, estimates from different literature suggest retrofitting typically 
costs anywhere from 1-20% of the house value (Gujarat 2001; Li, Stewart 2011, Stewart, Rosowsky, Huang, 
2003; Pinelli, Torkian, Gurley, Subramanian, Hamid, 2009). We make assumptions that retrofitting against 
cyclone wind can cost 5%, 7% or 10% of the housing value.  
 
We also assume that retrofitting against flood (including cyclone-induced rain) does not contribute to retrofitting 
against wind. Therefore the cost of retrofitting against flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and cyclone wind is 
the sum of the two retrofitting costs. From these assumptions, we estimated the total costs of retrofitting all 
housings against flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and cyclone wind damage. Table 23 below shows the 
cost in three different scenarios. 
Table 23: Costs of retrofitting all housings against flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and wind 
damage 
 Low Medium High 
 
Project cost 
(% of 
residential 
housing value) 
 
 
16% 
-­‐ 11% flood 
-­‐ 5% wind 
 
 
 
38% 
-31% flood 
- 7% wind 
 
 
 
60% 
-­‐ 50% flood 
-­‐ 10% wind 
 
 
Total (USD) 165,772,095 393,708,726 621,645,357 
 
Furthermore, since retrofitting is a one-time intervention, we assume for now that there is no maintenance cost 
associated. We also assume the lifetime of the retrofit to be 30 years. 
4. Benefits 
To assess the benefits of the housing retrofitting, assumptions have to be made about the economic losses that 
would be reduced as a result of the project. With regards to flood (including cyclone-induced rain) retrofitting, we 
follow the assumption that raising floor height reduces all potential losses from flooding to zero.  
For cyclone wind, we assume that retrofitting houses brings all houses up to the “high design quality” from the 
assumed state of “low design quality” according to the GAR 2013. According to the exposure file for Union des 
Comores used in Component II of this initiative, there are five housing structure types: adobe, concrete, unrefined 
masonry, refined masonry, and wood. The breakdown of house by type is seen in Table 24 below. 
Table 24: % of housings types in Union des Comores (based on housing value) 
Type Adobe Concrete 
Unrefined 
mansory 
(URML) 
Refined 
mansory 
(RML) 
Wood 
% of total value 1 11 61 9 18 
 
Based on Table 25, we identify the change in losses from wind damage to houses resulting from a shift in 
vulnerability from a low to high design quality. In order to do this we needed to identify the amount of damage 
associated with both “low” and “high design quality” housings relative to the strength of wind speed. This can be 
seen in Table 26 below. 
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Table 25: % of damaged value based on house type and wind speed 
  
 
Category of the cyclone 
(wind speed in kph) 
1 
(118-
153) 
2 
(154-
177) 
3 
(178-
210) 
4 
(211-
249) 
1 
(118-
153) 
2 
(154-
177) 
3 
(178-
210) 
4 
(211-
249) 
Type of the 
house 
LOW QUALITY HIGH QUALITY 
Adobe 0 2 12 53 0 0 2 8 
Concrete 0 1 3 18 0 0 0 2 
URML 1 3 13 53 0 0 1 8 
RML 0 2 9 40 0 0 1 5 
Wood 3 10 40 86 0 1 5 25 
Source: INGENIAR, 2014 
 
Using the CAPRA-GIS software, we estimated the percentage of loss reduction given the return period as a 
result of wind retrofitting.  We can see initially that all losses up to a category 2 storm will go to zero. Table 26 
below shows the loss reduction for given return period estimated from wind speed information in the CAPRA-GIS 
software. 
Table 26: Loss reduction as a result of retrofitting against tropical cyclonic wind 
Storm 
Category 
Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
                
Category 5 
return period <50 50 100 >500 
loss reduction 100% 90% 80% 25% 
 
Before estimating the annual benefit of retrofitting housings against flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and 
wind damage we had to estimate the AAL resulting from flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and wind 
separately. There was no precise way to identify this without applying more advanced analyses of the potential 
dependency between hazards using statistical methods such as Copula.  
As a first step of analysis, it was simply assumed that risk of flood (including cyclone induced rain) and cyclone 
wind is independent, and disaggregated the risk by taking the difference in estimated losses according to 
Hochrainer et al (2014) (USD 3.7 million, which includes both flood and cyclone (rain and wind)) and that of 
CAPRA estimate provided by the risk analyst team in Component II of this initiative (USD 0.95 million, which only 
includes cyclone wind). The latter figure was further adjusted to match the total asset exposure used in 
Hochrainer et al (2014). This step was necessary given the large discrepancy found in the total asset values cited 
by these studies. After the adjustment44, the AAL due to wind was estimated to be USD 1.2 million of the 
estimated USD 3.7 million total AAL for the housing sector. Given that AAL estimate based on Hochrainer-Stigler 
2014 (which include both flood and cyclone risks) is USD 3.7 million and cyclone wind-only AAL estimate based 
on the CARPA model is USD 1.2 million, we have calculated that 33% of the AAL is due to wind and the 
remaining 67 % of damages due to flood.  
From the procedures above we were able to estimate, the annual average benefit of retrofitting against flood 
(including cyclone-induced rain) and wind. Table 28 below shows the annual average benefit (reduction in AAL) 
as a result of retrofitting housings in Union des Comores. 
As can be seen, Table 27 the reduction in AAL is USD 3.4 million. Figure 53 displays the reduction in losses as a 
result of the project in graphic form. The shift in the loss distribution curve represents the risk reduction due to 
housing retrofitting. 
                                                            
44 As outlined in II.1., adjustment is based on CAPRA housing asset value data showing 53% of national assets in the housing 
sector. This was applied to the economic data of Hochrainer-Stigler (2014) showing USD 1.95 billion in national assets. By 
multiplying 0.53* 1.95 billion we obtained the adjusted housing sector value of USD 1.03 billion and applied this figure to the 
risk data provided by Hochrainer-Stigler (2014) to estimate the AAL for the housing sector. 
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Table 27: Estimated annual benefits as reduction in AAL due to retrofitting housings against wind and 
flood (including cyclone-induced rain) (in million USD) 
Return 
period 
Exceed
ence 
probab
ility 
Maximum 
loss 
Loss 
from 
flood 
(67%) 
Loss 
from 
wind 
(33%) 
Expected 
loss for 
period no 
action 
Flood 
loss 
reductio
n 
Wind loss 
reduction 
Expected loss 
for period after 
retrofit 
0 1.000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 100.0 100.0 0.000 
20 0.050 4.7 3.2 1.6 2.25 100.0 100.0 0.000 
50 0.020 10.1 6.8 3.3 0.22 100.0 90.0 0.007 
100 0.010 21.6 14.4 7.1 0.16 100.0 80.0 0.010 
500 0.002 161.1 108.0 53.2 0.73 100.0 25.0 0.181 
<500 0.002 161.1 108.0 53.2 0.32 100.0 25.0 0.080 
        
AAL 
Baseline: 
3.69 
    AAL after retrofitting: 0.278 
        
Reduced 
AAL: 
Benefit 
3.41 
Source: Author 
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Figure 53: Loss Return Period Curves Pre and Post housing retrofitting Project (in Million USD) 
 
Source: Author 
 
5. Time Factors 
5.1. Discount Rate 
There has been no official discount rate applied in Union des Comores. Therefore, we start with initial assumption 
of 5% (International Monetary Fund, 2013) but apply different rates as a means of sensitivity analysis. 
5.2 Increase in exposed assets 
As the retrofitting will only affect current houses in Union des Comores, it is assumed that future housings built 
would not benefit in any way from the retrofitting. The characteristics of retrofitting policy are different from 
infrastructure community project in which the benefits spread and influence external factors. Therefore it can be 
assumed that the benefits will remain at the values specified in Table 28, despite the increase or decrease of 
exposed assets due to socio-economic trends. 
III Results 
Using the data, provided information, and assumptions described to this point, we are able to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis for the project. Table 28 below shows the net present value of retrofitting all housings against 
flood and wind damage, assuming the benefits will last 30 years, and at a 5% discount rate. The cost of 
retrofitting in this scenario is 16% (11% for flood (including cyclone induced rain) and 5% for wind).  In this case, 
retrofitting all housings against wind and flood appears to be cost-inefficient with a net present value of USD -113 
million. In the conclusion we discuss reasons for the negative outcomes of this cost-benefit analysis and why the 
results may potentially be due to limited or unclear data, resulting in assumptions that limit the robustness of the 
results.  
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Table 28: Cost benefit analysis of retrofitting all housings against flood and wind, 5% discount rate, 
project cost of 16% of the house value (in USD) 
Year	   Calendar	  
Year	  
Costs	  USD	   Benefits 	   Net	  
benefits: 	  
benefits-­‐
costs	  
Discounted	  
costs	  
Discounted	  
benefits 	   	  
Discounted	  
net	  benefits 	  
1	   2013	   165,772,095	   0	   -­‐165,772,095	   165,772,095	   0	   -­‐165,772,095	  
2	   2014	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   3,247,619	   3,247,619	  
3	   2015	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   3,092,971	   3,092,971	  
4	   2016	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   2,945,686	   2,945,686	  
5	   2017	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   2,805,415	   2,805,415	  
6	   2018	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   2,671,824	   2,671,824	  
7	   2019	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   2,544,595	   2,544,595	  
8	   2020	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   2,423,423	   2,423,423	  
9	   2021	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   2,308,022	   2,308,022	  
10	   2022	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   2,198,116	   2,198,116	  
11	   2023	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   2,093,444	   2,093,444	  
12	   2024	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,993,756	   1,993,756	  
13	   2025	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,898,816	   1,898,816	  
14	   2026	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,808,396	   1,808,396	  
15	   2027	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,722,282	   1,722,282	  
16	   2028	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,640,268	   1,640,268	  
17	   2029	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,562,160	   1,562,160	  
18	   2030	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,487,772	   1,487,772	  
19	   2031	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,416,925	   1,416,925	  
20	   2032	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,349,453	   1,349,453	  
21	   2033	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,285,193	   1,285,193	  
22	   2034	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,223,993	   1,223,993	  
23	   2035	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,165,708	   1,165,708	  
24	   2036	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,110,198	   1,110,198	  
25	   2037	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,057,332	   1,057,332	  
26	   2038	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   1,006,982	   1,006,982	  
27	   2039	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   959,031	   959,031	  
28	   2040	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   913,363	   913,363	  
29	   2041	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   869,869	   869,869	  
30	   2042	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   828,447	   828,447	  
31	   2043	   0	   3,410,000	   3,410,000	   0	   788,997	   788,997	  
	   	   Sum	   0	   102,300,000	   -­‐63,472,095	   165,772,095	   52,420,058	   -­‐113,352,037	  
 
Table 29 and Table 30 will show sensitivity analysis with regards to the discount rate and the cost of the project. 
For Table 30 we will make some changes in the assumptions with regards to the project costs. In the current 
state, it is assumed that all housings in Union des Comores will be retrofitted. However, it is probable that 
housings in certain regions are much more exposed and vulnerable than housings in other regions. While there 
was no available data on specific regional vulnerability, we still are interested in plausible scenarios. Therefore, 
Table 31 shows the NPV and B/C ratio when a different percentage of housings are retrofitted, but resulting in the 
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same annual benefit. While we initially assume that all housings are retrofitted to reduce the vulnerability and 
bring about the annual benefit of USD 3.41 million, we here show what the net benefit and B/C ratio would be if 
only 50%, 33%, and 25% of the housings would need retrofitting to result in the same annual benefit. By 
changing the number of houses to be retrofitted, we are changing the overall cost of the project while keeping the 
annual average loss caused by wind and flood damage, as well as annual average benefit of retrofitting the same 
value. With no specific data on the number of housings, we assume that the cost of retrofitting a certain 
percentage of the housings is the same as the percentage in terms of total housing value.  
Table 29: Sensitivity analysis with regards to the discount rate 
discount	  
rate	  
0%	   2%	   5%	   7%	   10%	   15%	  
NPV	   -­‐63,472,095	   -­‐89,400,182	   -­‐113,352,037	   -­‐123,457,265	   -­‐133,626,317	   -­‐143,382,104	  
B/C	  ratio	   0.62	   0.46	   0.32	   0.26	   0.19	   0.14	  
 
 
Table 30: Sensitivity analysis with regards to percentage of houses retrofitted 
 
houses	  retrofitted	   100%	   50%	   33%	   20%	  
NPV	   -­‐113,352,037	   -­‐30,465,989	   -­‐2,284,733	   19,265,639	  
B/C	  ratio	   0.32	   0.63	   0.96	   1.58	  
 
IV Conclusion 
The results of the cost-benefit analysis for retrofitting housings against flood (including cyclone-induced rain) and 
wind damage suggest that it would be a cost-inefficient project. However, there are a number of factors regarding 
the data and the assumptions that potentially limit the validity of the figures found in this report.  
For example, we have no concrete data on house value. The only metric provided from potential housing value 
comes from an exposed asset file, which shows 53% of the national assets falling into the residential sector. It is 
unclear if this figure is the value of the housings itself (which is the assumption used in this analysis), or if it 
includes all of the assets owned by households. If the latter is the case, then the estimation of the value of 
housings would be significantly over-estimated, resulting in an overestimation of both ALL and total retrofitting 
costs.  
The second issue is with regards to the project retrofitting costs. With no local estimate, the cost of retrofitting for 
wind and flood could be significantly different than the figures taken from previous findings based in other 
countries. For example, in this study, we used the figures from Woodruff (2008) which estimated that cost of 
raising the floor heights of housings to be anywhere from 11-50% of the housing value in Samoa. We also have 
no information on flood exposure in the country, which significantly limits the quality of present analysis.  
It is also important to keep in mind that the present assessment did not take into account many of the indirect and 
intangible losses, such as loss due to business interruption and any reduction in land values that may result due 
to frequent disasters. These are clear limitations of this current analysis and further studies are certainly needed 
to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of our analysis. 
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Annex D: Workshops and Meetings in IOC region  
 
Inception meeting 
 
Dates: 15-17 April 2013 
Venue: ICCS, Seychelles 
Host:  Ministry of Environment 
UNISDR staff in charge: Julio Serje, Kazuko Ishigaki, Manuela Di Mauro 
Participants: 34 
 
Component 1: capacity building for national disaster loss database 
Comoros national workshop:  
Dates: June 11-13, 2013 
Venue: Hotel Retaj 
Host: the Civil Protection and the Ministry of Environment.  
UNISDR staff in charge: Sylvain Ponserre and Julio Serje 
Participants:  25 
 
Seychelles national workshop:   
Dates: 14 - 19 Jul 2013.   
Venue: Seychelles Fishing Authority, Division of Risk and Disaster Management (DRDM) 
Host: the Division of Risk and Disaster Management (DRDM)  
UNISDR staff in charge:  Sylvain Ponserre 
Participants: 22 
 
Madagascar national workshop:  
Dates: 28 Jul - 01 Aug 2013.   
Venue: Hotel Colbert 
Host: The "Cellule de Prévention et Gestion des Urgences"(CPGU) 
UNISDR staff in charge: Sylvain Ponserre 
Participants: 36 
 
Mauritius national workshop:  
Dates: 24 - 29 Aug 2013.   
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters 
Host: Ministry of Environment 
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UNISDR staff in charge:  Sylvain Ponserre 
Participants: 40 
 
Zanzibar national workshop:  
Dates: 11-14 June 2013 
Venue: Zanzibar Ocean View Hotel 
Host: NBI Office  
UNISDR staff in charge:  XXXXX 
Participants: 37 
 
Component2: Capacity building for Probabilistic Risk Assessment: 
 
First regional workshop 
Dates: 21-23 October 2013 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters, Mauritius 
Host: Ministry of Environment  
UNISDR staff in charge: Manuela Di Mauro, Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 40 
 
Second regional workshop 
Dates: 20-22 November 2013 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters, Mauritius 
Host: Ministry of Finance 
UNISDR staff in charge: Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 22 
 
 
 
Third regional workshop 
Dates: 19-21 March 2014 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters, Mauritius 
Host:  
UNISDR staff in charge: Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 31 
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Mauritius national workshop:  
Dates: 17-18 February 2014 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission Secretariat 
Host:  
UNISDR staff in charge: Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 10 
 
Seychelles national workshop:  
Dates: 23-27 June 2014 
Venue:   
Host: The Division of Risk and Disaster Management (DRDM) 
UNISDR staff in charge: Mabel Cristina Marulanda Fraume (consultant) 
Participants: 
 
Component 3: economic analysis and public investment planning 
 
First regional workshop 
Dates: 24-26 June, 2014 
Venue: ICCS, Seychelles 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Lezlie Moriniere (consultant) 
Host: Ministry of finance 
Participants: 15 
 
Second regional workshop 
Dates: 20-22, October, 2014 
Venue: Indian Ocean Commission headquarters, Mauritius 
Host: Ministry of Finance 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Lezlie Moriniere (consultant) 
Participants: 19 
 
Zanzibar national workshop:  
Dates: 10 December, 2014 
Venue: Zanzibar Ocean View Hotel 
Host: Department of Environment 
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UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Lezlie Morinière (consultant) 
Participants: 30 
Seychelles national workshop:  
 
Dates: 02-03 Feb 2015 
Venue: Conference Center 
Host: Ministry of Finance 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Julio Serje, Lezlie Moriniere (consultant) 
Participants: 30 
Comoros national workshop:   
Dates: 05-06 Feb 2015 
Venue: Direction générale de la Sécurité Civile 
Host: Direction générale de la sécurité civile 
UNISDR staff in charge: Julio Serje, Lezlie Morinière (consultant) 
Participants:55 
 
Madagascar national workshop:  
Dates: 28-30 Feb 2015 
Venue: STC 
Host: Ministry of Finance 
UNISDR staff in charge: Kazuko Ishigaki, Lezlie Morinière (consultant) 
Participants: 30 
 
Mauritius national workshop:  
Dates: tbc 
Venue: tbc 
Host: tbc  
UNISDR staff in charge: tbc 
Participants: tbc 
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UNISDR Working Papers on 
Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction 
 
 
1. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Mauritius, February 2015 
 
2. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Madagascar, February 2015 
 
3. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Seychelles, February 2015 
  
4. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Union des Comores, February 2015 
 
5. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of Zanzibar, February 2015 
 
6. Public Investment Planning and Financing Strategy to Reduce and Mange Disaster Risk: Review 
of South-West Indian Ocean Region, February 2015 
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The	  series	  offers	  analysis	  and	  policy	  guidance	  to	  national	  governments	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  to	  strengthen	  
public	  investment	  planning	  and	  financing	  strategy	  to	  reduce	  and	  manage	  disaster	  risk.	  These	  reviews	  are	  part	  
of	  a	  larger	  body	  of	  UNISDR	  work	  on	  disaster	  risk	  reduction,	  including	  loss	  database	  building,	  global	  probabilistic	  
risk	  assessment,	  HFA	  Monitor	  and	  others.	  This	  work	  includes	  both	  theoretical	  reports	  and	  reports	  on	  specific	  
countries	  or	  regions.	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